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ERASING RACE FROM LEGAL EDUCATION
Judith G. Greenberg*
In this Article, Professor Greenberg argues that law schools claim
to treat African American students as iftheir race is irrelevant, yet
law school curricula have a hidden message that African American
students are in fact inferior and dangerous to white students. When
African American students do not perform as well as white students, they are assumed to have deficient skills and are placed in
remedial programs to improve those skills. Professor Greenberg
argues that the cause of African American students' poor performance in law school is not necessarily deficient skills, but rather
a bias inherent in the structure of legal education that rewards
cultural traits that do not match those often identified with African
American culture. Thus, despite their claims to be color-blind, law
schools provide inherent preferences for students who can act,
think, and write white.

INTRODUCTION

It is no secret that African American 1 law students tend to
do less well academically than their white counterparts. Many
attribute this discrepancy to a lack of skills. Law schools often
seek to remedy the situation through academic support programs which, in turn, result in only marginal success. Despite
their lack of efficacy, academic support programs are popular
with the faculty and administrations of predominantly white
*
Professor of Law, New England School of Law. B.A. 1969, Cornell University;
J.D. 1972, University of Wisconsin Law School; LL.M. 1979, Harvard Law School. I
would like to thank Leslie Espinoza, Ken Greenberg, Duncan Kennedy, Dorothy
Roberts, Elizabeth Spahn, and Robert Ward for their help on this Article. This Article
is dedicated to the memory of my late colleague, Mary Joe Frug, who was my ally,
intellectual mentor, and friend. I miss her tremendously.
1.
A note on usage is appropriate here. I am using the term"African American"
to refer to those Americans whose identities derive, in part, from the forced importation and enslavement of Africans in the United States. I am specifically using this
term "African American" because it leaves room for the separate recognition of dark
skinned Americans with other cultural backgrounds, including recent immigrants from
the West Indies or Haiti. Cf Adrien K. Wing, BriefReflections Toward a Multiplicative
Theory and Praxis of Being, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 181, 181 n.3 (1990-1991)
(identifying herself as "Black" because she believes it is a more inclusive term than
"African American"). For a general discussion of how a particular minority group's
history and culture affects its relationship to education, see JOHN U. OGBU, MINORITY
EDUCATION AND CASTE: THE AMERICAN SYsTEM IN CRoss-CuLTURAL PERSPECTIVE (1978).
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law schools. If these programs are only marginally successful,
why are they so popular? This Article suggests new ways to
answer this question.
African American law students' comparatively poor performances in law school are not surprising. This poor performance
was noted as early as the 1960s. 3 Whether we measure academic success in terms of attrition rates, ranking within the
class, or bar pass rates, African American law students perform
dramatically worse than white law students. The attrition rate
for minority law students in the 1970s exceeded the attrition
rate for all law students by fifty to one hundred percent. 4 A
study by the Law School Admission Council (LSAC) in 1986
showed that the situation for African American law students
had not improved much over the intervening ten years: their
attrition rate was twenty-five percent while the rate for nonminority students was only fourteen percent. 5
2.
Although the historically African American law schools also have academic
support programs, see Paul L. Diggs, Communication Skills in Legal Materials: The
Howard Law School Program, 1970 U. TOL. L. REV. 763, their programs are set in a
radically different social context and may have very different meanings than similar
programs at other law schools. This Article is addressed to the education of African
American students at predominantly white law schools.
3.
See, e.g.' LAW SCH. ADMISSION TEST COUNCIL, LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION TEST:
ANNUAL COUNCIL REPORT 155 (1969) (finding that polled schools' major attempts to
provide special tutorial programs were uniformly unsatisfactory); Ernest Gellhorn,
The Law Schools and the Negro, 1968 DUKE L.J. 1069, 1083 (describing low success
levels of African Americans in Emory's pre-law school summer programs).
4.
Portia Y.T. Hamlar, Minority Tokenism in American Law Schools, 26 How.
L.J. 443, 532 (1983). Much of the literature in this area discusses minority students
in general without focusing on African American students specifically. I use this
literature, but I indicate when it discusses all minority students instead of only
African American students. This literature is helpful because what is true of minority
students in general is probably true of African American students in particular.
5.
Developments: Minority Attrition in Law School, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 144, 145
(1987). Data on class rank and bar pass rates also illustrate the difficulties that
African American law students are having with law school. One study of students from
two _large California state law schools showed that over 75% of the African American
students who applied for admission to the California bar were in the bottom quarter
of their classes. Stephen P. Klein, Disparities in Bar Exam Passing Rates Among
Racial I Ethnic Groups: Their Size, Source, and Implications, 16 T. MARSHALL L. REV.
517, 525 (1991). On average, these students ranked in the bottom 15% of their law
school classes. Id. Similarly, bar pass rates for African American law students have
been comparatively low. Oregon and Florida report that African American applicants
pass the bar examination at approximately two-thirds the rate of white applicants,
while in California and Colorado their pass rate is about half that of white applicants.
Dannye Holley & Thomas Kleven, The Bar Examination and Other Barriers to African
and Hispanic American Fair Representation among American Lawyers: A 1990
Update-Perspectives and Recommendations, 16 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 477, 488-90
(1991) (listing bar exam pass rates for California, Oregon, and Colorado from 1985
to 1990); Ken Meyers, Studies Suggest That Minorities Still Lag in Admissions, Tests,
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Law schools, for their part, have tried to remedy the problem
through a variety of academic support programs which focus
on improving African American students' analytical, writing,
and doctrinal skills. 6 These programs have had some limited
success in reducing African American students' attrition rates
in law school, but those rates· remain disproportionately high. 7
For example, approximately twenty percent of those who
participated in the early days of the pre-law school program
run by the Council on Legal Education Opportunity (CLEO),
a well-known and long-established program, left law school
without completing their degrees. 8 Over a three year span in
the Mellon program at the University of Pittsburgh Law
School, approximately thirteen percent of the African American
first year students were unable to advance to the second year. 9

NAT'L L.J., Feb. 24, 1992, at 4 (discussing a study which showed that 76% of whites
but only 46% of Blacks passed the Florida bar examination); see also Daniel 0.
Bernstine, Minority Law Students and the Bar Examination: Are Law Schools Doing
Enough?, B. EXAMINER, Aug. 1989, at 10 (describing low bar passage rates of minority
graduates of three of the "better" law schools). These dismal statistics have prompted
several state bars and the LSAC to conduct studies to attempt to ascertain the cause.
See, e.g., MAsSACHUSETl'S BARAss'N CoMM. ON BAR ADMISSIONS, THE BAR EXAMINATION:
Is IT FAIR? (describing concerns about minority law school graduates' low bar pass
rates and making recommendations to improve those rates); Henry Ramsey, Jr., Law
Graduates, Law Schools and Bar Passage Rates, B. EXAMINER, Feb. 1991, at 21
(describing a LSAC bar passage study). The disparities in bar passage rates, however,
may be less severe than they appear if large percentages of African Americans who
initially fail the bar exam pass it on subsequent attempts. See id. at 26 (noting that
the bar passage study would provide data on this phenomenon at a national level).
6.
See infra Part III.
7.
Assessments of the success of academic support programs are difficult,
however, because control groups rarely are available. Paul T. Wangerin, Law School
Academic Support Programs, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 771, 776 (1989) (decrying the methodological and interpretive problems of evaluating academic support programs).
8.
Hamlar, supra note 4, at 543; Ralph R. Smith, The CLEO Experience: A
Success by Any Measure, 22 How. L.J. 399, 400 (1979). These figures should not be
taken as a criticism of CLEO in particular. Almost 45% of those who participate in
CLEO ultimately do graduate from law school, a significant accomplishment given
that without CLEO many of these students would never have been admitted to law
school in the first place. Hamlar, supra note 4, at 543; see also Leo M. Romero, An
Assessment ofAffirmative Action in Law School Admissions after Fifteen Years: A Need
for Recommitment, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 430, 434-35 (1984) (noting that over 70% of
CLEO graduates who were admitted to law school completed it successfully).
9.
Kevin Deasy, Enabling Black Students to Realize Their Potential in Law
School: A Psycho-Social Assessment ofan Academic Support Program, 16 T. MARsHALL
L. REV. 547, 558 (1991); see also Daniel 0. Bernstine, An Empirical Study of the
University of Wisconsin Law School Special Admissions Program: A Progress Report,
7 BLACK L.J. 146, 151 n.20 (1981) (reporting that the Legal Education Opportunities
Program at the University of Wisconsin Law School, which enrolled primarily African
American students, was able to assist 78% of participating students to pass their first
year); Graham Hughes et al., The Disadvantaged Student and Preparation for Legal
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In general, despite the fact that at least 109 American Bar
Association accredited law schools reported having some type
of academic support program, 10 attrition rates for minority
students from 1981 to 1988 ranged from a high of 30.2% in
1985 to a low of 24. 7% in 1986, with a rate of 26.9% in 1988. 11
In contrast, attrition rates for majority students during the
same period ranged from 10.8% to 13.4%, with a rate of 11.3%
in 1988. 12
Furthermore, even if programs have successfully reduced
attrition levels, 13 they have not had much success in moving
African American students' grade point averages (GPAs) to a
distribution that resembles that of the majority students. For
example, at the University of Oregon Law School almost threequarters of the students who participated in the Academic Support Program from 1984 to 1987 had GPAs in the bottom half
of their first year class. 14 Similarly, in the Mellon program over
a three year period, only eighteen percent of the African
American students achieved grade averages of"B-" or better. 15
The result is that, although African American law students
may not be flunking out of school at the extraordinarily high
rates that existed prior to the institution of support programs,
their GPAs remain unacceptably low.
The various efforts to provide academic support to African
American students do not appear to have generated solutions
to their low GPAs. Perhaps this absence of significant success
Education: The New York University Experience, 1970 U. TOL. L. REV. 701, 713 (noting
that despite the tutorial program arranged for African American students, 12 out of
14 involved had below "C" averages); Allyson L. Moore, Minority Programs: Do They
Pass?, N.J. L.J., July 19, 1990, at 1 (describing disproportionate bar exam failure rates
for academic support program graduates, including African Americans, from New
Jersey's three law schools).
10. MINORITY .AFFAIRS COMM. OF THE LAW SCH. ADMISffiON COUNCIL, SUMMARY REPoRT
ON THE ISAC QuFsnONNAIRE ON 8PEcIAL LAW ScHOOL PRooRAMS FOR MINORITY STuoENTS
73, 97, 125 (1988) [hereinafter MINORITY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE REPORT).
11.
Holley & Kleven, supra note 5, at 485.
12. Id.
13.
For example, the Mellon Program at the University of Pittsburgh Law School
reduced attrition rates of African American students from over 50% to approximately
13%. Deasy, supra note 9, at 557-58.
14.
In the 1984-1985 school year, 71.5% of the academic support program
students were in the bottom half of their first year class. In the 1985-1986 school
year, 69.6% were so placed, and in the 1986-1987 school year, the percentage rose
to 78.6%. Charles L. Finke, Affirmative Action in Law School Academic Support
Programs, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 55, 67--69 (1989). The Oregon program served generally
"disadvantaged" law students, not just African Americans. See id. at 61. The majority
of participating students were minority students. See id. at 62 n.21.
15.
Deasy, supra note 9, at 558.
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should be taken as an indication that our current understanding of the problem-that African American students lack
skills-is incomplete. Thus, it is appropriate to revisit the
question that has haunted legal educators for more than a
decade: Why do African American law students perform so
poorly in law school?
This Article offers a different way of thinking about this
question. Instead of focusing on the "deficiencies" of African
American law students, I investigate the structure of legal
education and its construction of those students. Part I briefly
describes the social ideal of a color-blind legal system. This
ideal is premised on the assertion that race is irrelevant to
individual identity. Since legal education does not exist in a
vacuum, this norm can be expected to have a significant effect
on the treatment of racial issues within law school.
Part II turns to the law school context and examines the
claim of color blindness in this setting. The curriculum, the
teaching materials, and the common pedagogical techniques all
are structured around a norm of whiteness that is rendered
color-blind by the unstated assumption that African American
students are fundamentally the same as white students. Race
is addressed only through widespread silence. Deeply submerged and in opposition to this assertion of color blindness
is the hidden message of the curriculum, materials, and
techniques that African American students are inferior and
dangerous to the white students. These two messages exist
simultaneously in the curriculum, in tension with each other.
Part III looks at two issues that overtly raise the question
of race: affirmative action and academic support programs.
This Part explores the two distinct discourses of these programs. One discourse primarily denies differences, but, to the
extent that differences are perceived, it redefines them as
superficial and remediable deficiencies. As with the legal
system in general, the counterpoint is a second discourse in
which the differences are recognized, found to demonstrate
inferiority in the particular context, and claimed to be dangerous to the white students. 16
Part IV argues that some African American law students
may perceive themselves as different from white students in

16.
Cf. Regina Austin, Black Women, Sisterhood, and the Difference I Deviance
Divide, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 877 (1992) (exploring the distinction between deviance
and difference in the context of the Black female community).
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ways that are fundamental and not superficial. Drawing on
postmodern cultural and linguistic criticism, this Part describes
the roles that African American communities, a distinct oral
linguistic tradition, and an oppositional stance toward white
culture play in the development of some African Americans'
identities. For students who understand themselves in this
way, law school may require not just new skills, but a new self.
My claim in this Article is that African American students'
relatively poor performance need not be attributed to the
students' deficient skills, as traditionally has been the case. Instead, that poor performance reflects a bias inherent in the
structure oflegal education that rewards cultural traits which
do not match those of African American culture. 17 In particular,
oral skills often are identified as especially well-developed and
appreciated within African American communities. Yet, legal
education rewards excellence in writing over excellence in oral
performance, even though oral skills are clearly relevant to a
lawyer's effectiveness.
Thus, my goal is not to propose new programs that could
supplement the current structure of legal equcation and
therefore improve African American students' performances.
Rather, it is to suggest that under the current structure,
students whose identities are culturally African American
.necessarily will experience considerably more difficulty in law
school than students whose identities are more consistent with
the dominant white culture. In other words, law school, despite
its claims to be color-blind, is not culturally neutral; it provides
inherent preferences for students who can act, think, and write
white.
I. COLOR-BLIND IDEOLOGY AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM

One way to answer the persistent question about why
African American law students perform less well than their
white counterparts is to consider the context within which legal
education occurs. The legal system, in general, claims to be

17.
I am not claiming that all African Americans share a single culture or that
all African Americans share the traits that I describe. I only claim that these are
traits that many African Americans have identified as fundamental to their identities
as African Americans. See infra Part IV.
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color-blind 18-a claim which supports mainstream American
culture and practices. 19 Exploring the law's assertion of colorblindness provides a framework within which to discuss similar
assertions of racial neutrality in the discourse of legal education.
The color-blind stance was stated almost a hundred years ago
by Justice Harlan in his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 20 in
which he wrote: "Our Constitution is color-blind."21 Although
he was unable to convince the Court to adopt his position in
Plessy, his powerful metaphor resurfaced with the Civil Rights
movement of the 1960s. 22 By then, Andrew Kull reports, "some
members of the Supreme Court appeared to regard the color
blindness of the Constitution as a settled thing." 23 This assumption of color blindness is reflected in judicial statements
such as: "[R]acial classifications are obviously irrelevant and
invidious."24
The ideology of color blindness asserts that decision making
without attributing value to skin color is both desirable and
practicable. 25 According to color-blind ideology, race implies no
more about an individual than does that person's hair or eye
color, height, weight, or nose length. A person's "important"
traits-such as intelligence, perseverance, and curiosity-are
determined by who the person is, not by that person's race. 26
18. The blindfolded woman who symbolizes justice is an example of this-she
supposedly does not see the particular characteristics of the claimants who stand
before her. Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Images of Justice, 96 YALE L.J. 1727,
1758 (1987). These unseen characteristics include race. But see Neil Gotanda, A
Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind", 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 6 n.20 (1991)
(arguing that, while a blind test may theoretically avoid noticing race, "in the real
world very few judgments about people are made without a moment of racial
identification").
19.
Gotanda, supra note 18, at 2-3; Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 758, 762.
20.
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
21.
Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
22.
For a detailed history of claims that the Constitution should be interpreted
as "color-blind," see ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION (1992).
23.
Id. at 164.
24.
Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683, 687 (1963); see KULL, supra note 22, at
164.
25.
Gotanda, supra note 18, at 16; see also Kimber le W. Crenshaw & Gary Peller,
Reel Time I Real Justice, in READING RoDNEY KING/READING URBAN UPRISING 56, 60
(Robert Gooding-Williams ed., 1993) (maintaining that the "embrace of 'color
blindness' as the norm of equal protection" in Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469
(1989), means that "racism consists of the failure to treat people on an individual basis
according to terms that are neutral to race").
26.
See T. Alexander AleinikoH: A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
1060, 106~ (1991) (explaining that race is an "arbitrary factor," and that "to categorize
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Advocates of a color-blind approach to decision making argue
that "to treat race ... as a proxy criterion for a particular
viewpoint or perspective [or set of abilities] is to engage in
illegitimate stereotyping-racism ... -of the most pernicious
form." 27 This argument is based on the belief that "[p]eople are
not intellectual captives of their skin color."28
According to this understanding of the world, individuals
stand alone. Who they are is not determined in any predictable
way by their histories; their character traits and positions
cannot be determined by consideration of the communities with
which they affiliate. To think of individuals in terms of their
communities would be to stereotype them in just the manner
that color-blind decision making is intended to prevent. 29 Thus,
decisions about public policy must be race neutral.
A color-blind stance claims not only that race is irrelevant
to decisions about people, but that individuals' own life choices
are unaffected by their race. As Dwight Greene illustrated in
his discussion of Florida v. Bostwick, 30 the Court analyzes cases
on the assumption that race does not affect how people act. 31
Bostick involved a request by Florida police to search an
African American bus passenger's luggage for drugs. The police

on the basis of race is to miss the individual"); Gotanda, supra note 18, at 40
(describing "formal-race").
27.
Michael S. Paulsen, Reverse Discrimination and Law School Faculty Hiring:
The Undiscovered Opinion, 71 TEX. L. REV. 993, 1000 (1993); but see STEPHEN L.
CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY 29--34 (1991) (arguing that racial
stereotyping is now considered in vogue and progressive).
28.
Paulsen, supra note 27, at 1000.
29.
In 1964, Louis Lusky wrote that a stereotype is:
[A] conception of a group of people as possessing, each of them, certain characteristics that are believed to inhere in the group; a conception that is factually
erroneous; and a conception that is impervious to rational refutation because
it is rooted in the emotions rather than the intellect.
. . . The stereotype ... involves a sort of hysterical paralysis . . . .
Louis Lusky, The Stereotype: Hard Core of Racism, 13 BUFF. L. REV. 450, 450-51
(1964). He continued by noting that the important point about stereotypes is that "any
stereotype results in a partial blindness to the actual qualities of individuals, and
consequently is a persistent and prolific breeding ground for irrational treatment of
them." Id. at 451.
30.
501 U.S. 429 (1991).
31.
Dwight L. Greene, Justice Scalia and Tonto, Judicial Pluralistic Ignorance,
and the Myth of Colorless Individualism in Bostick v. Florida, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1979,
2022-43 (1993); see also Gotanda, supra note 18, at 36-52 (arguing that the Court
typically approaches race as a formal classification that is unconnected to historical
and social background).
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admitted that they did not have any "articulable suspicion" for
choosing to search this particular passenger's luggage. 32 The
legality of the search, and the admissibility of the cocaine that
was found in the luggage, turned on whether the passenger
had given consent voluntarily. 33 Greene pointed out that the
Court's opinion never mentioned that the defendant was an
African American. 34 This color-blind Court wrote as if the
history of police relations with African American communities
in America's urban areas was irrelevant to an African American bus passenger in south Florida faced with a request from
the sheriffs department officers to search his luggage. 35
Once race is rejected as an irrelevant and irrational basis for
decision making, something else must be substituted. For many
who subscribe to color-blind decision making, this other
criterion is merit. 36 Merit can be defined as the ability to perform a particular task or the possession of qualities considered
valuable. 37 Ideas of merit are consistent with a focus on the
individual instead of the group. 38

32. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 431.
33. Id. at 432.
34.
Greene, supra note 31, at 2028.
35. For additional discussions of the relevance of African Americans' relations
with the police to their reactions to the police, see CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ET AL.,
NAACP, BEYOND THE RoDNEY KING STORY: AN INvESTIGATION OF POLICE CONDUCT IN
MINORITY COMMUNITIES (1995); David Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can the Violence Be
Contained?, 27 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 465, 488-90 (1992); Robert V. Ward, Consenting to a Search and Seizure in Poor and Minority Neighborhoods: No Place for a
"Reasonable Person", 36 How. L.J. 239, 248-53 (1993). See generally NATIONAL ADVISORY
CoMM'N ON ClvIL DISORDERS, REPoRT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY CoMMMISSION ON ClvIL
DISORDERS 157-68 (1968) (describing the causes of ghetto inhabitants' hostility toward
the police and proposing reforms to help alleviate that hostility).
36. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action
in Legal Academia, 1990 DUKE L.J. 705 (refuting the idea that decisions based on
merit are color-blind by arguing that judgments of merit are not culturally neutral).
37.
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., To Each According to His Ability, From None According
to His Race: The Concept of Merit in the Law of Antidiscrimination, 60 B.U. L. REV.
815, 826-27 (1980); see also Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 446 F. Supp. 979,
1014 n.87 (E.D. Mich. 1978) ("[l]f 'affirmative action' is a term mandating equality
ofresult then this country is not far from rejection of the concepts of individual merit
and achievement ....");Stephen L. Carter,Academic Tenure and "White Male" Standards: Some Lessons from the Patent Law, 100 YALE L.J. 2065, 2068 (1991) (arguing
that the merit of scholarship should be evaluated objectively in terms of its overall
contribution to human knowledge, regardless of the scholar's perspective or subject
matter); Kennedy, supra note 36, at 709-10 (noting that one of the "tenets of
colorblindness" is that "[m]erit is a matter of individual traits or products," not groupbased status).
38.
Fallon, supra note 37, at 822. But note that race may sometimes be an acceptable component of determining merit. For example, in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), Justice Powell wrote that an acceptable kind of racial
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The combination of merit-based standards and ideas of
individual autonomy also permits an understanding of choice
that places the decision not to be meritorious squarely on the
individual instead of on society or the social structure. For
example, in EEOC v. Sears, 39 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that Sears' failure to
employ women as salespeople for items sold at a large commission did not violate Title VII because Sears produced survey
evidence indicating that women chose less competitive and less
demanding positions. 40
Thus, three tenets of the ideology of color blindness are
particularly relevant to this discussion. First, decisions about
the structure of society should be made without reference to
the race of the people affected. Second, individuals' decisions
are made independently of race. Finally, it is possible to create
race-neutral criteria for determining who should receive
rewards and who should not.
Each of these tenets can be illustrated by analyzing the
Supreme Court's decision in City of Richmond v. Croson. 41 In
Croson, the Court held unconstitutional an ordinance that
required contractors who were awarded city construction
contracts to subcontract at least thirty percent of the work to
qualifying minority businesses. 42 The Court rejected the
appellant's claim that the ordinance could be justified as
remedying injuries caused by past racial discrimination. 43
preference in an admissions program is one that "treats each applicant as an
individual in the admissions process." Id. at 318. Despite the fact that race is often
considered a group characteristic, Justice Powell specifically referred to the importance of treating each applicant as an individual in order to fit race within the
framework of merit. Id. In contrast, the Supreme Court found racial quotas to be
unconstitutional because they insulated individuals from comparison with other
individuals. Id. at 320.
39. 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988).
40. Id. at 329-30. In Sears, the court treated the women's choices as if they were
not influenced by social and economic structuring of gender roles or by gender's
structuring of the family and work roles. For a discussion of the court's conception
of choice in Sears, see MARY JOE FRUG, POSTMODERN LEGAL FEMINISM 12-18 (1992); Joan
W. Scott, Deconstructing Equality-versus-Difference: Or, the Uses of Poststructural
Theory for Feminism, 14 FEMINIST STUD. 33, 38-45 (1988); Vicki Shultz, Telling Stories
about Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace
in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749,
1752-54 (1990). In similar ways, African Americans' choices often are portrayed as
if they are not influenced by the context of race in American society. See infra text
accompanying notes 51-59.
41.
488 U.S. 469 (1989).
42. Id. at 511.
43. Id. at 498-99.

FALL 1994)

Erasing Race from Legal Education

61

According to the Court, the identification of such injuries would
be '.'sheer speculation" based on "statistical generalizations"
that were not "tied to any injury suffered by anyone."44 In other
words, the Court found the ordinance unconstitutional because,
in the absence of findings of actual injury suffered by African
Americans in the construction industry, "there [was] a danger
that ·a racial classification [was] merely the product of unthinking stereotypes or a form ofracial politics."45 This was not
an acceptable basis for making social decisions. The city,
therefore, was unable to demonstrate the compelling interest
necessary to uphold a racially based set-aside program. 46
The Court's decision relied on its determination that the
traditional bidding process had provided a neutral means of
allocating the public contracting opportunities. Although the
bidding process itself was not challenged, the Court noted
repeatedly that there was no evidence of prior discrimination
in the Richmond construction industry. 47 As a result, the new
bidding process, with its requirement of awarding a percentage
of bids to minority contractors, could be seen as a race-based
mechanism for awarding contracts.
Also consistent with the tenets of color-blind ideology, the
Court in Croson did not believe that the selection of bids and
the ability to bid were affected by the bidder's race. 48 In fact,
the Court relied on testimony indicating an absence of racial
discrimination. For example, at the public hearing at which the
ordinance was originally heard, one witness noted that minority contractors, if available to bid, would have the same opportunities to do so as anyone else. 49 The Court also noted that
representatives of the local contractors' organizations indicated
that they did not discriminate on the basis of race and were in
. fact actively seeking minority members. 50 Thus, the Court
assumed, based on this testimony, that no minority contractor's
decision on whether to bid on a particular project should have
been affected by her race.

44.
Id. at 499.
45.
Id. at 510.
46.
Id. at 505.
47.
Id. at 500, 503, 505.
48.
Id. at 480 ("There was no direct evidence of race discrimination on the part
of the city in letting contracts or any evidence that the city's prime contractors had
discriminated against minority-owned subcontractors.").
49.
Id. (citing Councilperson Kemp).
50. Id. at 481.
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In its description of the minority subcontractors' choices, the
Court missed the same type of evidence of how race affects
individual choices that it missed in Bostick. 51 The opinion in
Croson describes circumstances which in effect limited the
minority subcontractor's opportunities to bid on the construction project. There were only two manufacturers whose
products met the bid specifications. 52 In its effort to prepare a
bid, the minority subcontractor, Continental, contacted two
suppliers of the approved products. 53 The first already had
submitted a quotation directly to the general contractor,
Croson, and refused to provide a quote to Continental, while
the second was not familiar with Continental and therefore
required. thirty days to complete a credit check. 54 Finally,
Continental contacted an agent of the second approved manufacturer.55 The quotation that this agent made to Continental
was not only "subject to credit approval," but was also "substantially higher than any other quotation Croson had
received." 56 Croson, instead of asking the city to keep the bids
open long enough to allow the credit check to be completed, and
instead of asking the first manufacturer to deal with Continental, requested that the city waive the set-aside requirement. 57
The Court did not see Continental's difficulties in participating in the bidding process as deficiencies in the supposedly
neutral bidding process's ability to identify meritorious contractors. Rather, it treated them as deficiencies in Continental.
Just as it understood the women in Sears as "choosing" not to
seek major commission sales jobs, and just as it understood the
African American defendant in Bostick as freely choosing to
cooperate with the police in the aisle of the bus, the Court's
emphasis on past discrimination implies that Continental's
difficulties are not attributable to current discrimination in the
bidding process but to Continental's poor choices. The Court's

51.
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991). For a discussion of Bostick, see supra
notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
52.
Croson, 488 U.S. at 481.
53. Id. at 482.
54. Id. It is entirely possible that the first agent's refusal to deal with Continental
and the second agent's credit requirement were related to Continental's minority
status. The Court never considers this possibility. Minority-owned businesses in
Richmond rarely belonged to local trade associations. Id. at 529 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 483.
57. Id. at 482.
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language in discussing Continental's inability to submit a bid
before the date when the waiver request was submitted is
significant: "By October 19, 1983, Croson had still not received
a bid from Continental." 58 The use of the word "still" implies
that the Court believed that Continental should have submitted its bid earlier, despite the fact that it had been told less
than a week before that a credit check would take thirty days,
and despite the fact that Continental had promptly informed
Croson of the credit problems. The Court did not consider
whether Croson could have waited to submit the waiver
request until after the credit check was completed. 59
Failure to consider the facts leading up to Continental's late
bid allowed the Court to act as if Continental was able to do
business in the same way as majority businesses, unhampered
by subtle, unconscious forms of racial discrimination. 60 The
Court also implied that it was somehow Continental's fault
that its bid could not come in on time; perhaps Continental was
an inefficient, poorly run, or otherwise undeserving business.
Thus, the Court treated Continental as if it had chosen not to
perform adequately. In short, reliance on so-called objective
measures allowed the Court to ignore both the social context
in which decisions about bidding are made and the effect that
race has on individual choices and options.
In Croson, the Court assumed that Croson merited the award
because of its bid and that Continental did not because Continental chose to bid late. Claims of merit-based decisions and
of individual choice allow Americans to believe that race is
irrelevant to decisions in modern America. Despite this belief,
race matters. 61 This should be clear to anyone who reads
stories of police or security guard conduct, 62 anyone who has

58. Id.
59.
AB it turned out, Croson's request for a waiver was denied on November 2 and
sometime after December 9 the city informed Croson that it had decided to rebid the
project. Id. at 483. The results of the credit check should have been in long before
that, so Croson might not have needed to move so rapidly in asking for a waiver.
60. See generally Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (describing unconscious racism and arguing that it should be considered in applying and interpreting
the Equal Protection clause).
61.
This phrase is the title ofComel West's new book, CORNEL WEST, RACE MATTERS
(1993). For a similar use of the phrase, see RUTH FRANKENBERG, WHITE WOMEN, RACE
MATTERS (1993) (describing the ways in which the experience of being white is
constructed by race).
62. See, e.g., Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Notes from California: Rodney King and the
Race Question, 70 DENV. U. L. REV. 199, 201-06 (1993). Culp, an African American
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ever pressed a doorbell for entrance into an urban boutique, 63
or anyone who has ever looked at pornography64-to name just
a few of the areas in which race matters.
In addition, because actions that are prohibited in the public
sphere often are protected in the private sphere, the public/private dichotomy functions to permit the continuance of
differential and inferior treatment of African Americans. An
individual's social decisions are understood as private and
therefore not subject to an investigation as to whether they are
racially motivated. 65 This allows whites to exclude African
Americans from their private lives. It also allows the courts to
accept the "choices" that African Americans make--choices like
permitting police to open baggage on a bus or to run a business
inefficiently-as if they were made freely and were unaffected

professor at Duke Law School, described being stopped and questioned by traffic police
after having retrieved something from his office late at night:

As I turned near the law school I noticed that a campus police car was following
me. This police car sped up and followed as closely as it could as I approached
the next light. . . . [T]he policeman turned on his overhead police lights and
pulled me over .... I asked him why he had pulled me over, and I showed him
my driver's license. He stopped me, he said, because I had crossed the double
lines at the intersection. I pointed out to him that that argument was just silly
because the nature of the interchange made it virtually impossible to cross the
yellow: lines. He glanced at my driver's license and simply got back into his car
and drove off. I never knew if he noticed that my driver's license lists me as a
white male which, despite what his eyes told him, may have immunized me, or
whether-as I have always contended-the campus police are required to
remember the faces of all 35 black faculty members. I have no doubt, however,
why I was stopped. It was the interaction of the color of my skin, my apparent
age ... and my gender ....
Id. at 203; see also OGLETREE ET AL., supra note 35 (describing the influence ofrace on
policing); Deborah W. Post, Race, Riots and the Rule of Law, 70 DENY. U. L. REV. 237,
257-59 (1993) (describing being shadowed by a security guard while shepherding her
black son and young cousins through a museum).
63.
See PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALcHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 44-40 (1991) (describing her experience of being denied access to Benetton by a white employee even
though other (white) customers were in the store).
64.
See PATRICIA HILL CoLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT 167-73 (1991) (describing
the representation of Black women in pornography); ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY
215-17 (1981) (same).
65.
Gotanda, supra note 18, at 8-12. For critiques of the coherence of the
public/private distinction, see Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the
Public I Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982); Karl E. Klare, The
Public I Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1358 (1982); see also
Robert H. Mnookin, The Public I Private Dichotomy: Political Disagreement and
Academic Repudiation, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1429 (1982) (discussing the arguments for
and against the recognition of a "private sphere" not subject to government regulation
and the possible dimensions of that sphere).
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by race. Since these choices are understood as freely made,
they function to legitimate African Americans' subordinate
positions in society. According to the ideology of color blindness, African Americans chose these inferior positions.
Characterizing African American subordination as a product
of choice, as in cases like Bostick and Croson, is not the only
way in which legal doctrine perpetuates that subordination.
Kimberle Crenshaw's study of race discrimination law describes the ways in which racial subordination remains despite
the existence of civil rights laws. 66 She notes that the stereotyped characteristics once attributed to African Americans as
a result of biology are now ascribed to culture. 67 Furthermore,
the presence of "white" traits like ii:idustriousness and intelligence are understood to account for white success. 68 In order
for civil rights laws to create true equality of whites and
African Americans, whites would have to "confront myths about
equality of opportunity that justify for them whatever measure
of economic success they may have attained. "69
Legal doctrine also perpetuates subordination through the
way in which the courts have interpreted the First Amendment. 7° Charles Lawrence argues that the First Amendment
has been interpreted to protect certain constitutional values
but not others, thereby reinforcing the subordination of racial
minorities. 71 Although the First Amendment's exception for
"fighting words" usually is interpreted as excluding racial
insults, Lawrence shows that racial insults have the same
emotional impact as fighting words and the same "preemptive
nature"-they are unanswerable. 72 Unlike racial epithets,
however, the danger of "fighting words" to the public peace is
66.
Kimberle W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation inAntidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988); see also Alan
D. Freedman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination through Antidiscrimination Law:
A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049 (1978) (tracing
the history of Supreme Court decisions in the area of racial discrimination and
discussing the reasons for their failure to alleviate that discrimination); Mari J.
Matsuda, Voices ofAmerica: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence for
the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329 (1991) (analyzing the ways in which
distinguishing nonconforming accents allows employers to discriminate without
sanction).
67.
Crenshaw, supra note 66, at 1379.
68.
Id. at 1373.
69. Id. at 1381.
,
70.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
71. Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech
on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431.
72. Id. at 452-53.
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easily understood from a white male perspective. 73 In contrast,
regulation of racial hate speech is seen as an incursion on the
protections accorded by the First Amendment to all Americans. 74 Hate speech and its subordinating message are thereby
protected as speech. The fact that people of color must pay a
particular and unique price for protecting free speech is overlooked. 75
The Supreme Court also perpetuates the subordination of
African Americans by its language, which Neil Gotanda argues
reinforces ideas of white supremacy. 76 He looks at cases dealing
with voting rights, affirmative action, and jury selection and
finds that the Court often considers race to be a characteristic
unconnected to a social context or a particular history. 77 Thus,
decision making based on race is irrational and racism becomes
an irrational prejudice. 78 As a result, the types ofremedies that
plausibly can combat racial subordination are limited. 79
Gotanda concludes:
This disaggregated treatment [ofrace] veils the continuing
oppression of institutional racism. It whittles racism down
to the point where racism can be understood as an attitude
problem amenable to formal-race solutions. . . . [This]
hinders this country's ability to address the clear correlation between racial minority populations and the concentrations of these various, supposedly distinct problems.
Even if one admits that large numbers of the unemployed
and undereducated youth in the inner cities are Black,
unconnectedness hinders the government's ability to use
that correlation as a basis for attacking social ills. 80
Law becomes part of the system that supports racial subordination instead of being part of the cure.
Thus, the ideology of color blindness declares both the
irrelevance of race and the inferiority of African Americans.
Overtly, it asserts that African Americans should be treated

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 454.
Id. at 473-75.
Id. at 4 75.
See Gotanda, supra note 18.
Id. at 40-42.
Id. at 43-44.
Id. at 44.
Id. at 45.
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the same as whites. Covertly, however, it continues to accept
doctrines like those allowing private racism and thereby
permits the subordination of African Americans. It is in this
context that we must consider the construction of African
American law students' identities in legal education.

II. THE DISCOURSES OF LEGAL EDUCATION:
CURRICULUM AND PEDAGOGY

A. Claims of Color Blindness
Like the larger legal culture, legal education also makes
claims to color blindness. As with the legal system in general,
these claims support and legitimate the status quo in legal
education. These claims assert that it is not necessary to
consider race in making policy decisions, such as curricular
decisions, about the structure of legal education. They also
assert that people's responses to that structure will not be
affected by their race. This is a claim that legal education is
race neutral.
Most of the time, the claim to be color-blind is made through
silence. Discussions of legal education rarely mention race as
a factor relevant to a student's success. For example, Robert
Granfield's recent study of the culture of law school, Making
Elite Lawyers, 81 does not treat race as an organizing principle,
although it does include chapters on women and working-class
students. 82 The major liberal critiques of the 1970s that identified legal education as inhumane83 or impractical 84 barely

81.
RoBERT GRANFIELD, MAKING ELITE LAWYERS (1992). Granfield does not omit
African American law students entirely. He includes one quotation from an African
American law student in making the point that while most law students enter law
school for career reasons, some enter for altruistic reasons. Id. at 39. This, however,
simply demonstrates my point that the race of the student is not important to
Granfield. Rather, the student is quoted to prove a statement about all law students'
motives in entering law school. Meaning is attributed to the student's intentions, but
not to his race. In fact, Granfield does not include index entries for "Black" students,
"African American" students, or "students of color.• See id. at 244-48.
82.
Id. at 94-122.
83. See, e.g., Jack Himmelstein, Reassessing Law Schooling: An Inquiry into the
Application of Humanistic Educational Psychology to the Teaching of Law, 53 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 514 (1978) (emphasizing the importance of individual and social development
in the process of obtaining a legal education).
84.
See, e.g., Michael Meltsner & Philip G. Schrag, Scenes From a Clinic, 127 U.
PA. L. REV. 1 (1978) (contrasting the role of a clinic faculty advisor with that of a law
school professor).
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touched on issues of race. The more leftist-oriented critique by
people associated with the Critical Legal Studies movement
focused on the ways in which legal education worked to reproduce hierarchy in general,s5 but not, until recently, on racial
hierarchies in particular.s6 Similarly, much of the important
feminist legal literature of the late 1970s and early 1980s
· ignored the significance of race. 87
The message of color blindness also is implicit in many of the
common practices of legal education. Law schools' goal of
teaching each student to "think like a lawyer" resonates with
color blindness, since skin color is not considered relevant in
determining whether one is thinkinglike a lawyer. The phrase
"thinking like a lawyer" has meant discovering the underlying
scientific principles of the law-principles that are equally
available to and supposedly have equal meaning for all students, regardless of race.ss The result, as Kimberle Crenshaw
notes, is that "when the discussion involves racial minorities,
minority students are expected to stand apart from their
history, their identity, and sometimes their own immediate
circumstances and discuss issues without making reference to
the reality that the 'they' or 'them' being discussed is from [the
minority students'] perspective 'we' or 'us.' "89
85.
See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierar·
chy, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 591 (1982) (describing the hierarchies resulting from students'
competitiveness in class, grading and ranking, career placement, and the professors'
interests in preserving school rankings).
86.
Crenshaw, supra note 66, at 1356.
.
87.
See, e.g., Ann E. Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and the Supreme
Court, 92 YALE L.J. 913 (1983) (discussing the Supreme Court's application of the
Equal Protection Clause and Title VII in the context of sex discrimination); Sylvia A.
Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 963-66 (1984)
(discussing the "analogies between race- and sex-based discrimination" and arguing
that, although there are real sex-based differences in terms of reproductive capacity,
"[t]here is no reason to believe that black and white people are inherently different
in any way that should ever be allowed to matter in the law"); Wendy W. Williams,
Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment I Special Treatment Debate, 13
N. Y. U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325 (1984-1985)(highlighting the feminist debate over
whether a woman's ability to reproduce demands special litigative attention to
equalize the sexes in the workplace).
88.
See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 41-43 (Mark DeWolfe Howey
ed., 1963) (2d ed. 1881) (noting the impossibility of taking individual characteristics
into account in determining if one is acting reasonably); Jerome M. Culp, Jr.,
Autobiography and Legal Scholarship and Teaching: Finding the Me in the Legal
Academy, 77 VA. L. REV. 539, 546 (1991) (noting that the personal usually is considered irrelevant to law because "[!]aw has to treat rich and poor, pretty and ugly, black
and white alike"); Margaret E. Montoya, Mascaras, Trenzas, Y Grenas: Un I Masking
the Self While Uni Braiding Latina Stories and Legal Discourse, 15 CHICANO-LATINO
L. REV. 1, 20-21 (1994) (explaining the legal discourse assertion that there is only one
relevant reality).
89.
Kimber!e W. Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in
Legal Education, 11 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 1, 3 (1989).
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Consistent with the claim of color blindness, most law schools
require students to identify themselves on their examinations
by number instead of by name. Instead of interpreting the
exam in light of the student's comments and positions in class,
faculty are expected to grade according to objective, meritbased standards commonly identified by the anagram "IRAC."90
According to Paul Carrington, this practice of blind grading
was instituted as a means of ensuring against favoritism for
specially admitted minority students. 91 Blind grading was seen
as a way of guaranteeing that race did not impact on the
meritocratic evaluative process. By holding the African American students to the same standards as the white students,
legal education reiterated its claim of race blindness.
As noted above, 92 one of the central tenets of a color-blind
approach to decision making is that race is an illegitimate
criterion upon which to base a policy decision. In terms oflegal
education, this means that African American students are not
seen as differing from white students in the various traits that
might matter such as intelligence, industriousness, and alacrity. Law schools construe African American students to be the
same as white students underneath their skin. They view their
students' differences as superficial-the color of their skin. 93

90. Students are told to identify the issue, state the relevant rule(s), analyze the
problem, and come to a conclusion. For discussions of law school exams, see Philip
C. Kissam, Law School Eiaminations, 42 VAND. L. REV. 433 (1989); Janet Motley, A
Foolish Consistency: The Law School Exam, 10 NOVA L.J. 723 (1986); Steven H.
Nickles, Examining and Grading in American Law Schools, 30 ARK. L. REV. 411
(1977); see also Norman Redlich & Steve Friedland, Challenging Tradition: Using
Objectiue Questions in Law School Examinations, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 143 (1991) (recommending the use of multiple choice examinations in lieu of or in addition to traditional
essay exams).
91. Paul D. Carrington, One Law: The Role of Legal Education in the Opening
of the Legal Profession since 1776, 44 FLA. L. REV. 501, 565 (1992).
·92. See supra Part I.
93. Jerome M. Culp points out that there is a long history of assuming that
"'Negroes are, after all, only white men with Black skins, nothing more, nothing
less.'" Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Posner on Duncan Kennedy and Racial Difference: White
Authority in the Legal Academy, 41 DUKE L.J. 1095, 1107 n.42 (1992)(quoting KENNETH
M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION vii (1956)). One Georgetown law student
expressed a similar sentiment when he said: "[E)very white male here thinks that if
he was black or a woman or some other minority, they'd be at Harvard or Yale ....
That's not true, but that's the impression." Saundra Torry, Racial Tension Scars
Georgetown's Veneer, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 1991, at Al, A9. The implication is that
difference is only skin deep. The color-blind approach to race does not allow for the
possibility that there may be cultural differences between African American and white
law students and that these differences may be significant in the context of legal
education. See infra Part IV.
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The message of color blindness and the claim that African
American students are ·the same as white students also is
visible in the structure of the curriculum. The core of the
curriculum in most law schools revolves around traditional
common law subjects and statutory courses on corporate,
commercial, and tax law. Race rarely is discussed in these
courses. For example, a review of the indexes of three prominent torts casebooks reveals that none of them contains an
entry for "African American," "Black," "Negro," or "Race."94
Although this does not necessarily mean that African Americans are not mentioned at all in these casebooks, it does mean
that the casebooks' editors did not consider the subject of
African Americans to be one with sufficient relevance to a torts
class that students might want to search for material according
to that category. In fact, all three of these casebooks do make
some references to race, for example, in their discussions of the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 95 Even here,
however, race is treated as an incidental, rather than an
analyzing principle. 96
94.
DAN B. DOBBS, TORTS AND COMPENSATION (2d ed. 1993); MARC A. FRANKLIN &
RoBERT L. RABIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES (5th ed. 1992);
WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (8th ed. 1988). Dobbs does
have an index entry under "Racial Discrimination," which sends the reader to
"Discrimination," under which there are six sub-entries. One of these is "Ethnic
indignities or racial slurs, mental distress." DOBBS, supra at 1075, 1062.
95.
DOBBS, supra note 94, at 58; FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 94, at 818-19;
PROSSER ET AL., supra note 94, at 62.
96.
Prosser, Wade, and Schwartz, in their casebook, address race and intentional
infliction of mental distress in a note following a case in which the plaintiff was
particularly sensitive because of a speech impediment. PROSSER ET AL., supra note 94,
at 57-60, 62. The implication is that, if one suffers mental distress due to racially
discriminatory treatment, it is somehow similar to the mental distress suffered in the
case of the plaintiff with the speech impediment. Although the commonalities and
differences between racial discrimination and discrimination based on other characteristics would make an interesting classroom discussion, Prosser, Wade, and
Schwartz have buried the subject in a two and one-half page section of notes in which
only two of the 28 cases involve race. Id. at 62. Furthermore, because the authors
describe each of the cases relating to race only briefly, the editors encourage discussion of the "plaintiffs sensitivity for race" in terms of the lead case (on the speech
impediment) instead of in terms of race. They thereby imply that racial characteristics
are not unique, bu·t rather are the same as other "superficial" differences like age,
religion, pregnancy, and hypertension.
Dobbs, in his casebook, also uses only the notes to treat racial discrimination as
the subject of intentional infliction of emotional distress. DOBBS, supra note 94, at 56.
In a series of questions, Dobbs covertly asks whether the power relationship between
the plaintiff and the defendant might not be important to the tort. Id. at 58. Certainly,
anyone focusing on this tort in a racial context would find this a relevant question.
He asks the questions so discretely, however, that a student is likely to miss their
importance unless the professor expressly refers to them in class. Dobbs's note asks:
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Similarly, the required 97 upperclass courses tend to treat race
as if it were irrelevant to their subject matters. This is because
race, in fact, has been made irrelevant to those courses as they
are usually taught; most of the areas in those subjects that a
significant number of African Americans might find interesting
have been excised from the basic course. 98
For example, corporations courses usually exclude issues
relating to the availability of public funding for small businesses. The traditional course will cover private funding

What pattern is suggested by these cases? Can it be stated in a way broad
enough to encompass LaBrier? Does the pattern here suggest that Mrs. LaBrier
might have been liable if it had been she who made accusations? Or that Mr.
Gomez might have been liable if his scatological vocabulary had been fired at
Mr. Hug?

Id.
Finally, Franklin and Rabin provide the longest treatment of racial insults of the
three casebooks: over a page of textual notes, which include a note on the Civil Rights
Acts and Title VII. FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 94, at 818-20. They treat the issue,
however, with as little affect as the other authors. Although they note that some
courts have found causes of action for intentional infliction of mental distress but
others have not, id. at 818-19, they fail to explain the differences in results. They do
cite some important current scholarly work on the subject, but again they do not
provide the student with any insight into what the works say. Id. at 819.
Certainly none of these treatments would encourage a student interested in the
relationship between race and law to believe that the tort of intentional infliction of
mental distress, or tort law in general, had or could have much to say about that
relationship. These casebook authors treat race as any other difference among
individuals. In this way, they reinforce the idea that African Americans differ from
whites in the same way that whites differ among themselves in hair color, height, or
weight. Cf. Mark Tushnet, Spite Fences and Scholars: Why Race Is and Is Not
Different, 26 CONN. L. REV. 285, 286-88 (1993) (arguing that racial discrimination is
different from other forms of discrimination).
97.
By "required" I mean the courses that students tend to think of as required
to pass the bar or to be literate in the law. I would include among these commercial
law, corporate law, evidence, tax, and trusts and estates. Agreement as to exactly
which courses fit this category is unnecessary because I contend that issues relating
to race will not be a focus of discussion regardless of the course. If it is understood
as a required course, race will be deferred to another course that is considered an
elective.
98.
For a similar analysis of contract law and women, see Mary Joe Frug, ReReading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34 AM. U. L. REV.
1065, 1089-93 (1985) (noting the absence of materials on reproductive technology and
marital contracts from the first year contracts course casebooks).
This excising of subjects ofrelevance to African Americans occurs despite the ways
in which the question of race has influenced doctrinal developments in a number of
subject areas. See Roy L. Brooks, Anti-Minority Mindset in the Law School Personnel
Process: Toward an Understanding of Racial Mindsets, 5 LAW & INEQ. J. 1, 14 n.41
(1987) (discussing the influence of race in civil procedure, constitutional torts,
property, criminal procedure, labor relations, trusts and estates, and employment
discrimination).
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through the sale of securities-an option not available to many
small businesses. Public corporations may touch more on the
lives of African Americans through their pensions or their labor
relations than through the type of governance issues discussed
in most corporations courses. Pensions and labor relations, and
even plant closings, however, are saved for other courses-ones
that generally are considered highly elective. Furthermore,
while most corporations courses include a segment on corporate
responsibility and the composition of the corporate board, only
the exceptional course is likely to make reference to the way
in which board selection procedures exclude African Americans.
Many not-for-profit corp9rations are active in African American
communities, yet their formation and governance usually are
not included in courses on corporations.
Race is likely to be a central feature only in courses that
students and faculty alike consider to be the highly elective
courses, designated and denigrated as not central to the
curriculum. In 1970, the Association of American Law Schools
· suggested that a "course in race relations law or in race, racism
· and justice could be supplemental to courses in constitutional
and civil rights law."99 Such courses remain supplemental
today. While many schools now have seminars in subjects like
race discrimination law or law and racism, few give race a
central place within the law school curriculum. 10°Furthermore,
African American law professors working toward tenure often

99.
J. Otis Cochran; The Law Schools' Programmatic Approach to Black Students,
17 How. L.J. 358, 379 (1972) (emphasis added)(citing AsSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW
SCHS., PROCEEDINGS: 1970 .ANNuAL MEETING (1970)). This has been recognized at least
since 1970. See James A. McPherson, The Black Law Student: A Problem ofFidelities,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 1970, at 93. McPherson notes that three Black students who
flunked out of his law school class may have done so because:
[T)hey failed to recognize that the study of law has no immediate relevance to
the black community. It is almost pure study. The real relevance comes only
after the period of training, when the individual student has to decide for himself
what role he wants to play with the tools he has. acquired. At this point, it seems
to me, the law becomes most relevant.

Id. at 96.
100. Northeastern Law School is one of the few to put racism in a central place.
It requires all first-year law students to take the course, "Law, Culture and Difference." Northeastern University Law School, Teaching Materials for Law, Culture and
Difference, Fall/Winter/Spring 1992-1993 (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform); see also Frances L. Ansley, Race and the Core Curriculum
in Legal Education, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1511 (1991) (arguing that race should be given
a central place in the law school curriculum because of its central place in constitutional history).
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are urged by their colleagues not to concentrate on issues like
race and law or civil rights. African American faculty have
been advised n<;>t to produce civil rights scholarship, or, after
writing about race, to pull back and write on something else. 101
If African American faculty followed this advice, the result
would be a dearth of research on these subjects or teaching in
these areas.
The vast majority of courses are taught from texts that focus
on appellate cases. 102 These cases rarely state the race of the
parties or the judge. But, in this society, if race is not indicated, the assumption is that the people involved are white. Of
course, this assumption will be true in most cases: the majority
of litigants are white as well as the majority of judges. 103 In
addition to the appellate cases, 104 some casebooks include
textual materials. These additional casebook materials, however, tend not to excerpt from articles written by African American legal academics. 105

101. African American faculty recounted this advice at the Plenary Session of the
Minority Law Teachers' Conference on the subject of"Current Responses to the BellDelgado Survey," held by the Association of American Law Schools in Washington,
D.C., on Oct. 10, 1992. The Bell~Delgado Survey questioned law faculty of color about
the conditions of their professional lives. Richard Delgado, Minority Law Professors'
Lives: The Bell-Delgado Survey, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 349 (1989).
102. The case method of teaching was first introduced in 1870 by Christopher
Langdell, then Dean of Harvard Law School. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN
LAW 42-43 (1977). This method remains widely used in law schools today. For a
detailed discussion and critique of the case method, see Russell L. Weaver, Langdell's
Legacy: Living with the Case Method, 36 VILL. L. REV. 517 (1991).
103. By the mid-1980s, only three percent of judges nationwide were Black. Ellen
L. Rosen, The View from the Bench-A National Law Journal Poll, NAT'L L.J., Aug.
10, 1987, at S-1, S-13. One study of a small claims court showed that the overwhelming majority of cases involved white plaintiffs suing white defendants. Arthur
Best et al., Peace, Wealth, Happiness, and Small Claim Courts: A Case Study, 21
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 343, 357 (1994).
104. I recognize that many people supplement casebooks with their own sets of
materials, but I have no way of analyzing these. Ever since Basic Books v. Kinko's
Graphics, 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), in which publishers successfully sued
the duplication business for copying book excerpts and compiling them in university
coursepacks without authorization, I suspect fewer people are using supplements and
those that are used are likely to be smaller than those previously used.
105. For example, neither a well-known torts casebook, DOBBS, supra note 94, nor
two torts anthologies, A TORTS ANTHOLOGY (Lawrence C. Levine et al. eds., 1993), and
RoBERT L. RABIN, PERSPECTIVES ON ToRT LAW (3d ed. 1990), ID.elude excerpts from African
American legal scholars' work. Furthermore, neither Dobbs' casebook nor PROSSER ET
AL., supra note 94 (which does not include excerpts of academic material), include
citations to the work of African American legal scholars. Many African American legal
scholars have written in the field of torts or on closely connected subjects. Works by
these scholars include Anita L. Allen & Erin Mack, How Privacy Got its Gender, 10
N. ILL. U. L. REV. 441 (1990); Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and
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The result is that legal educators only rarely refer to race.
The uniformity of silence on race should alert us to its nonaccidental nature. This silence can be understood within the
norm of color blindness as saying that discussions of topics that
allude to race are unnecessary because there are no relevant
differences between African Americans and whites. Given the
ideology of color blindness, the silence works to construct
African American students as white. Legal educators, who are
themselves predominantly white, 106 teach the subjects that are
important to them and to the predominantly white bar. 107 In
organizing their courses and their curricula around these
subjects, legal educators implicitly make the claim that African
American law students are, or ought to be, the same as white
students, and that they are, or ought to be, animated by the
same concerns that animate white students.
In short, the dual assumptions of color blindness-that race
is irrelevant to decisions about people and to decisions that
people make in their own lives-affect the structure of the
curriculum. The curriculum can be as silent on race as it is
because race is not considered a characteristic that is relevant
to the study of law. It is not relevant to the study of law, in
part, because decisions about people, and their courses of
study, should not be made based on race. In addition, according

the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1988);
Taunya Lovell Banks, The Scope ofSection 1985(3) in Light ofGreat American Federal
Savings and Loan Association v. Novotny: Too Little Too Late? 9 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q.
579 (1982); Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Causation, Economists, and the Dinosaur: A Response
to Professor Dray, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1986, at 23; Okianer C. Dark,
Is the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 the Solution for the DTP
Controversy?, 19 U. TOL. L. REV. 799 (1988); Patricia A. King, Treatment and Minors:
Issues Not Involving Lifesaving Treatment, 23 J. FAM. L. 241 (1984-1985).
106. LAW ScH. .ADMISSION 8ERVICFS, MlNORl'IY PARTICIPATION 1N LEGAL EDUCATION AND
THE PROFESSION: A COMPENDIUM OF DATA tbl. VIII-1 (1990) [hereinafter MINORITY
PARTICIPATION DATA] (reporting that minority faculty in 1989-1990 made up 8.7% of
all faculty, including faculty at the historically Black law schools).
107. In 1986-1987, three percent of the legal profession was African American.
Judy Rothotz, Are Hiring Practices a Factor? Percentage of Blacks in the Profession
Lags, N.J. L.J., Dec. 3, 1987, at 1, 30. In 1988, less than two percent of the attorneys
employed by the nation's 250 largest law firms were Black, while fewer than one
percent of the partners in these firms were Black. Deasy, supra note 9, at 551-52
(citing Doreen Weisenhaus, Still a Long Way to Go for Women, Minorities; White Males
Dominate Firms, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 8, 1988, at 1, 1, 48). In fact, more than 10% of the
250 largest firms reported employing no African American attorneys and more than
half had no African American partners. Id. For a study of the disproportionately low
number of Hispanic attorneys employed in large law firms, see Linda E. Davila, The
Underrepresentation of Hispanic Attorneys in Corporate Law Firms, 39 STAN. L. REV.
1403 (1987).
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to the ideology of color blindness, an individual's own decisions
about what to study are not affected by her race.

B. Claims of African American Inferiority
Although law schools claim to have color-blind curricula,
these curricula also can be seen to oppose the ideology of color
blindness. Just as legal doctrines governing discrimination law,
First Amendment law, and constitutional interpretation make
overt claims to color blindness that can be reinterpreted as
assertions of white supremacy, 108 the institutional practices of
legal education can be reread. The failure to refer to African
Americans or African American authors in casebooks can be
understood as a statement of their inferiority when compared
with whites. The message conveyed is that African American
work is not sufficiently valuable to be the subject of litigation
or to be reproduced in legal texts. Similarly, the silence about
African Americans in the subject matter of courses can be
understood as a mark ofinferiority. 109 According to this interpretation of the curriculum, African Americans are not simply
colored whites, they are different and inferior.
Law schools' implicit treatment of African American law
students as inferior is reinforced by the strong, negative
student reaction to the inclusion of materials on race in core
courses. Most law faculty are familiar with the way in which
students put down their pens the moment the subject of race
arises in a core course. A notorious example of this is the
demeaning response of students and faculty to Visiting Professor Derrick Bell's Constitutional Law class at Stanford Law
School in 1986. 110 At the time of this incident, Professor Bell
was a well-known African American with more than seventeen
years of law school teaching experience at Oregon, Harvard,
Emory, Illinois, the University of Washington, and Florida

108. See supra text accompanying notes 65-80.
109. See Knight v. Alabama, 14 F.3d 1534, 1553 (11th Cir. 1994) (remanding for
a determination as to whether state college curricula that marginalize the study of
African American thought, culture, and history are traceable to earlier de jure
segregation).
110. Derrick Bell, The Price and Pain of Racial Perspectiue, STAN. L. SCH. J., May
9, 1986, at 5; see also Okianer C. Dark, Just My 'Magination, 10 HARV. BLACKLETI'ER
J. 21 (1993) (describing white student resistance to discussing race in the classroom).
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State. 111 He also had served as the Dean of the University of
Oregon School of Law. Professor Bell taught his Constitutional
Law class from the same casebook that other Constitutional
Law professors used at Stanford but, unlike the other professors, Professor Bell taught the material in the order in which
the casebook presented it: before the students encountered
doctrinal materials, they were faced with a discussion of the
importance of slavery and property rights in the thinking of the
authors of the Constitution. 112 According to Professor Bell:
"[W]ithout this background, the later chapters devoted to
contemporary racial issues are not coherent. They seem on the
periphery of the constitutional pattern of which they may be
the most important part. "113
When some of the students in the class expressed dissatisfaction, apparently believing that issues of race were not of
particular importance to the study of constitutional law, some
faculty members established a lecture series to supplement
Professor Bell's course without telling him the purpose of the
lectures. 114 Ultimately, after protests by the Stanford Black
Law Students Association, the lecture series was cancelled and
the two dozen students who had been attending other constitutional law classes slowly drifted back to Professor Bell's
class. 115
The students' rejection of race as an appropriate topic of
discussion could be understood as a claim that African Americans are the same as whites and that therefore the study of
the history and context in which the Constitution was created
is irrelevant. 116 Professor Bell, however, saw the way in which
the lecture series was created as saying something different.
According to Professor Bell: "The fact of my exclusion from the
dialogues that must have taken place before so radical a
remedy for student upset was adopted was a denial of my
status as a faculty member and my worth as a person .... "117
He termed the event "stigmatizing" and "demeaning." 118 Even
weeks later, he experienced "abject humiliation" and "absolute
outrage" as a result of these events. 119

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Bell, supra note 110, at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra Part II.A.
Bell, supra note 110, at 5.
Id.
Id.
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Others also understood the episode as carrying a message of
African American inferiority. Faculty members were embarrassed by the event and referred to it as "outrageous." 120 They
offered their apologies to Professor Bell, as did the Dean and
a number of white students. This Incident serves as a reminder
to African American faculty and students of the ease with
which the message of African American inferiority surfaces. 121
Law students also might understand the overwhelmingly
white character of student bodies 122 and faculties 123 as a further
indication of the inferior status of African Americans. It would
be easy to interpret the predominant color of these bodies as
implying that African Americans were not smart enough to get
into law school, to stay in law school, or to be appointed to law
school faculties. 124
Furthermore, norms of privacy work within the law school
environment, as they do within the larger legal system, to
make possible the exclusion of African American students.
African American students often find it difficult to join

120. Id.
121. Although the fact that Professor Bell is African American may have made it
easier for the white students to go forward with their extraordinary plan, white
faculty who have tried to discuss issues ofrace in the classroom have also experienced
resistance. See, e.g., Frances L. Ansley, Race and the Core Curriculum in Legal
°Education, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1512, 1559-60 (1991) (recounting comments from students
who saw her curricular emphasis on race as an indication of impermissible bias).
122. In the 1991-1992 academic year, Blacks comprised only 6.3% of those attending ABA-approved law schools, despite the fact that Blacks make up approximately
12% of the United States population. The 6.3% figure appears to include students at
historically Black law schools. Ken Myers, Studies Suggest That Minorities Still Lag
in Admissions, Tests, NAT'L. L.J., Feb. 24, 1992, at 4.
123. In 1986-1987, Black faculty members constituted only 3. 7% of the faculty at
non-historically Black schools. Richard H. Chused, The Hiring and Retention of
Minorities and Women on American Law School Faculties, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 537, 538
(1988) (defining "faculty" to include non-tenure track teaching staff, such as clinical
staff); see also MINORITY PARTICIPATION DATA, supra note 106, at tbl. VIII-1 (showing
minority faculty in 1989-1990 to be 8.7% of all full-time professors, including all
minority-not just Black-faculty and including the historically Black law schools);
Delgado, supra note 101, at 351 (finding that momentum to hire minorities stalled
in the mid-1980s). Furthermore, Black faculty tend to be tokens at the majority-run
law schools. In 1991, over half of the ABA-approved law schools reported only two or
fewer full-time minority (Black, Hispanic, Native American, or Asian) faculty
members, while almost 10% of the schools continued to report no full-time minority
faculty members at all. ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS To THE BAR, A
REVIEW OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 14-63 (1991).
124. See Ian Haney-Lopez, Community Ties, Race and Faculty Hiring: The Case
for Professors Who Don't Think White, 21RECONSTRUCTION46, 51 (1991) (stating that
lack of faculty diversity sends message of inferiority); but cf Richard A. Posner,
Duncan Kennedy onAflirmatiue Action, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1157 (arguing against the use
of affirmative action in hiring by private law schools).
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predominantly white study groups. 125 Yet, much of the learning
and self-testing of law school takes place in these settings.
Similarly, white faculty members often serve as mentors to
white students, again leaving African American students out
of many of the informal settings in which learning takes place.
Finally, but just as importantly, African American students
tend not to be invited. to participate in white students' small,
informal social gatherings. These include eating meals andjust
relaxing. Although these settings usually are not conceived of
as educational, law school classes and law school survival
techniques frequently are discussed. By not participating in
these exchanges, African American students lose out on the
lore and knowledge about the institution and its participants.
Their exclusion from these important settings marks them as
different. It also may mark them as inferior in that no one
thought their ideas or company sufficiently desirable to invite
them.
The dominant message of sameness, with its underlying
message of difference and inferiority, also is reinforced through
the subject matter of the few core courses in which race is
likely to be considered frequently. In constitutional law, race
usually will be discussed in order to understand the development of the Equal Protection Clause. 126 This doctrine serves as
the paradigm of the assertion that African Americans are the
same as whites. Beginning with the pronouncement in Dred
Scott v. Sanford 121 that African Americans are neither "citizens" nor "people of the United States" within the meaning of
the Constitution, 128 and moving through the modern equal
protection cases, the cases usually are taught to show the
appropriateness of the norm of race-blind, equal treatment. 129
In contrast, in classes on criminal law and procedure, African
Americans ordinarily are portrayed as dangerous to white
125. The information in this paragraph is based on informal conversations with
students at New England Law School and with students and faculty from several
other law schools. It is anecdotal in character. See also Leslie G. Espinoza, Empowerment and Achievement in Minority Law Student Support Programs: Constructing
Affirmative Action, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 281, 291 (1989) (emphasizing the isolation
of students of color from both white students and faculty); see also Lawrence, supra
note 60 (describing the unconscious racism in many white-Black interactions).
126. "[N]or shall any state ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1.
127. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
128. Id. at 404.
129. Cf Gotanda, supra note 18, at 62 (arguing that the ideology of race-blind
constitutionalism actually promotes white supremacy).
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America. Here, African Americans are the criminals-people
who inflict or try to inflict injury on white law-abiding citizens.130 Consistent with notions of race blindness, most criminal cases do not identify the race of either the defendant or the
victim, but, those that do often identify the defendant as
African American and occasionally identify the victim as
white. 131 Despite the fact that a disproportionate number of
crimes in the United States are committed against Black
victims, 132 the identifications in these cases reinforce the
popular construction of African Americans, and in particular,
African American males, as dangerous to whites.
Both the construction of African Americans as the same as
whites and the competing construction of them as different and
inferior have the effect of reinforcing the status quo in legal
education. If African American students are indeed the same
as white students, then there is no need to adjust legal education to accommodate the presence of slowly increasing numbers
of African American students. These new students should fit
right in, simply replacing or adding to the white students who
traditionally have been present. Similarly, if African American
students are different from and inferior to white students,
there is no reason to change legal education to take their needs
into account. To do so would diminish the quality of legal
education, downgrading it from the high standard previously
provided to white students to a lower quality of education that
African Americans could survive. 133 Thus, construction of
African American law students as either the same or different

130. Crenshaw, supra note 89, at 4 (noting that "[i]t is not unusual for [criminal
law] professors to base a hypothetical on the presence of a Black·person in a white
neighborhood"); WILLIAMS, supra note 63, at 80-90 (discussing the use of racial
classifications in law school exam questions).
131. A review of the first 35 Supreme Court cases excerpted in JAMES B. HADDAD
ET AL., CASES AND CoMMENTS ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (4th ed. 1992), reveals that the
race of the defendant or the victim is disclosed in only four cases. In one, the
defendant is identified as being Black and the victim as white. Id. at 13 (excerpting
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936)). In the second, the defendant is Black and
is noted to have sold drugs to a Black undercover cop; there is no victim. Id. at 266
(excerpting Mason v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977)). In the third, the victim is
described as white, but the defendant's race is not given, id. at 160 (excerpting Brewer
v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977)), while in the fourth the Court implies that the
defendant is Black. Id. at 388 (excerpting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
132. Irene Sege, Race, Violence Make Complex Picture, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 31, 1990,
at 1. The vast majority of victims of violent crime are the victims of someone of their
own race. Id. African Americans, however, are overrepresented both among the victims
of crime and those who commit crimes. Id.
133. See infra text accompanying notes 193-200.
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and inferior to whites serves to legitimate the continuation of
the status quo in legal education.

III. THE DISCOURSE OF COLOR BLINDNESS AND LEGAL
EDUCATION: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
AND ACADEMIC SUPPORT PROGRAMS
There are two areas oflegal discourse in which silence on the
issue of race is particularly difficult: affirmative action and
academic support programs. Both of these programs are
associated primarily with students of color, even if they also
serve some white students. 134 In both of these areas, the
dominant discourse constructs African American students as
white. Sometimes this is clear from the language used; other
times it is implicit. As with the rest oflegal education, however, there is also a discourse that constructs African American
students as different and inferior.
One way that academic support programs construct African
American students as white is through their emphasis on
enhancing students' skills. There are many different types of
academic support programs 135-summer programs, tutorial
programs, special legal writing programs-but most of them
are aimed primarily at improving the students' abilities to
write and to spot issues. 136 The implication is that the participating African American students' skills can be made indistinguishable from the non-participating white students' skills.
For example, the CLEO program, one of the earliest and best
known academic support programs, traditionally devoted
approximately fifty percent of its curriculum to the development of legal writing skills. 137 The emphasis on improving
analytical and writing skills continues today. The current
Mellon Program at the University of Pittsburgh focuses on
these skills: "Writing and analytical skills are emphasized

134. See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
135. As of 1988, at least 62 law schools had academic support programs. MINORITY
AFFAIRS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 10, at 73, 97, 125 (listing the law schools with
summer orientation, tutorial, and legal writing programs).
136. Espinoza, supra note 125, at 291.
137. Alfred A. Slocum, CLEO: Anatomy of Success, 22 How. L.J. 335, 357 (1979);
see also Leo M. Romero et al., The Legal Education of Chicano Students: A Study in
Mutual Accommodation and Cultural Conflict, 5 N.M. L. REV. 177, 219 (1975) (noting
that each regional CLEO summer institute was required to have a writing program).
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because these are the skills that will ultimately determine the
individual's success or failure as a law student." 138 The New
England School of Law has run both an intensive, weekendlong writing workshop and a "drop-in" writing clinic. 139
Other programs emphasize substantive knowledge. 140 The
assumption behind these programs is that African American
students do not perform as well on their examinations and
papers as white students because they have less knowledge of
the material. Recent examples of substantive programs include
the Academic Support Program of the University ofOregon, 141
the Charles Hamilton Houston Enrichment Program at the
New England School of Law, and the support program recommended by the LSAC. 142 All three programs involve both
substantive seminars and individualized tutorials. 143

138. Deasy, supra note 9, at 569; see also Thomas W. Christopher & Frederick M.
Hart, Indian Law Scholarship Program at the University ofNew Mexico, 1970 U. TOL.
L. REV. 691 (describing a pre-law school summer program aimed at teaching written
and oral argument); Brenda S. Hampden, Preparing Undergraduate Minority Students
for the Law School Experience, 12 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 207, 218 (1989) (noting that
Seton Hall's pre-law program added a legal writing component); David E. Neely,
Minority Participation in Legal Education: Innovative Approaches Toward Racial
Parity, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 559, 575 (1986) (describing John Marshall Law School's
emphasis on development of writing skills); Henry Ramsey, Jr., Affirmative Action
at American Bar Association Approved Law Schools: 1979-1980, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 377,
389 (1980) (describing academic support programs' goals of improving writing skills);
_Stephen R. Ripps, A Curriculum Course Designed for Lowering the Attrition Rate for
the Disadvantaged Law Student, 29 How. L.J. 457, 466-80 (1986) (proposing an
introduction to the law course which would teach, among other things, case briefing
and legal writing); Nerissa Bailey-Scott Skillman, Misperceptions Which Operate as
Barriers to the Education of Minority Law Students, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 553, 557-58
(1986) (emphasizing minority students' difficulties with legal writing).
139. I chaired the Task Force that reorganized New England's programs for
minority students from 1989-1991, and then administered the newly created "Charles
H~lton Houston Enrichment Program" during the 1991-1992 academic year.
140. It would be inaccurate to imply, and therefore I do not mean to do so, that
most programs fail to attack writing skills, substantive deficits, and learning
methodologies simultaneously.
141. This program is described in Finke, supra note 14, at 61-70.
142. LAW SCH. ADMISSION CoUNCII/LAW SCH. ADMISSION SERVICES, AN INTRoDUCTION
To AcADEMIC AssISTANCE PRooRAMS (1992) [hereinafter AcADEMIC AssISTANCE PRooRAMS];
see also Richard F. Devlin & A. Wayne MacKay, An Essay on Institutional Responsibility: The Indigenous Blacks and Micmac Programme at Dalhousie Law School, 14
DALHOUSIE L.J. 296, 314-15 (1991) (describing institution of subject-matter tutorials);
Romero et al., supra note 137, at 223-25 (describing a programmed studies course
designed primarily for Mexican American students).
143. The LSAC proposal has four components in an academic year: seminars, small
group sessions, individual sessions, and examination writing sessions. The seminars
are intended to clarify, expand upon, and assist in the synthesis of the information
presented in the large classes, while the small group sessions provide more intensive
analysis of the information conveyed by the professor. In the individual sessions,
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Still other programs focus on learning skills instead of either
writing ability or substantive knowledge. For example, Paul
Wangerin recommends that students be taught to learn independently.144 He believes that those students who "experience
academic difficulty'' are dependent learners. This would explain
why students in undergraduate academic support programs
show only short term grade improvement. 145 The case method,
according to Wangerin, is a useful vehicle for teaching independent learning because it "force[s] students to formulate their
own solutions to their academic problems." 146
Regardless of the specific emphasis of a particular academic
support program, they are all premised on the assumption that
African American students would do better in law school if only
they could bring their skill level up to that of white students.
Furthermore, these programs would not exist if it were not
assumed that such skill improvement was possible. Katherine
Vaughns, for example, notes that law students with "high
predictors"-the students admitted through the "regular" admissions process-undoubtedly have mastered the skills required in order to "think like lawyers." 147 The challenge for law
faculty, according to Vaughns, is to teach the specially
admitted-minority-students to think like these regularly
admitted-white-students. 148 Similarly, a description of a
model academic support program, prepared for the Law School
Admission Council/Law School Admission Services, asserts:

students can focus on legal issues that are posing particular difficulty for them.
ACADEMIC AsSISTANCE PROGRAMS, supra note 142, at 27-31.
The Oregon School of Law program also includes support seminars, small-group
or individual sessions, and review sessions. The seminars are intended to provide a
second opportunity for the student to become familiar with the material from the large
classes; the small-group or individual sessions are occasions for synthesizing the
material periodically; the review sessions allow for summations at the end of the
semester. Finke, supra note 14, at 63-64.
The New England School of Law program offers a six-week seminar in the spring
semester that involves substantive faculty lectures and student-run tutorial reviews
of written answers to problems developed by the faculty. See supra note 139 and
accompanying text.
144. Wangerin, supra note 7, at 802; see also Edmund W. Gordon, Educating More
Minority Engineers, 91 TECH. REV. 69, 72 (1988) (arguing that support programs should
stress problem-solving skills); Katherine L. Vaughns, Towards Parity in Bar Passage

Rates and Law School Performance: Exploring the Sources of Disparities between
Racial and Ethnic Groups, 16 T. MARsHALL L. REV. 425, 470-74 (1991) (stressing the
need to teach "problem-solving" skills to students of color).
145. Wangerin, supra note 7, at 786.
146. Id. at 797-801.
147. Vaughns, supra note 144, at 470.
148. Id.

FALL 1994)

Erasing Race from Legal Education

83

"The primary goal of an academic support program should be
to help students develop the abilities that are necessary to
independently proceed with their legal education." 149 In short,
the goal of support programs is to give the students in the
academic support program the skills that the white students
who are not in the program presumptively already possess.
This fundamental assumption of African American students'
sameness in relation to white students is signalled by the
terms used to describe students who participate in the programs. Students rarely are described in racial terms. Instead,
they are referred to as "nontraditional students" or students
"with special needs." 150 These terms presumably are intended
to indicate the inclusive nature of the programs, since both
white and African American, as well as Hispanic and Native
American, students fit within these categories. In other programs, eligibility is based on predictors of academic success,
such as Law School Achievement Tests (LSATs) and undergraduate grade point averages (GPAs). 151 Again, this language
implies that eligibility to participate in the programs is based
on neutral, non-racial criteria. Once more, the implication is
that there is no difference between white students and African
American students.
Thus, the entire existence of academic support programs is
based on the premise that African American and other minority
students are fundamentally the same as'white students and
that whatever superficial differences may exist can be corrected
through education. Academic support programs do not deny the
uncontroverted fact that African American students often do
not perform as well in law school as their white counterparts.
Instead of attributing these differences in performance to
fundamental differences between African American and white
students' identities or to possible pro-white biases in legal

149. ACADEMIC AsSISTANCE PROGRAMS, supra note 142, at 13.
150. See, e.g., id. at 1, 2 (using the term "nontraditional" to apply to students who
might participate iii an academic support program); Deasy, supra note 9, at 564

(describing the placement of Black students with other "nontraditional" students as
a way ofreducing stigma); see also Finke, supra note 14, at 62 (noting that the Oregon
Law School academic assistance program includes older students returning to school,
students with large differences between their Law School Achievement Test (LSAT)
scores and their undergraduate grade point averages (GPAs), and disabled students
in an academic support program).
151. Espinoza, supra note 125, at 285-86 (showing how the use of predictors to
identify students for support programs allows schools to ignore their role in perpetuating minority students' failures).
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education, the substance of those programs reasserts the
superficiality of any differences. Because skill deficiencies can
be remedied, such deficiencies do not challenge the perceived
sameness of African American and white law students.
Because law schools treat African American students the
same as white ones, continued inadequate or disappointing
performances by African American students, even after completing support programs, is likely to be understood as a result
of the choices made by those students. Poor performance often
is seen as the result of decisions by the student not to study
enough, not to seek out peer or professorial assistance, or to
engage in extracurricular activities at the expense of academic
ones. 152 Consistent with color-blind ideology, 153 law schools
treat these choices as unrelated to the individual's racial
identity. The result is that African American law students who
do not perform well are seen as similar to white students who
simply have made bad choices about their use of time.
Discussions of affirmative action also focus on the superficiality of the differences between African American and white
applicants for student or faculty positions, as well as on their
basic similarity to each other. Proponents and opponents both
endorse the position that race is not a relevant factor in
determining a student's success in law school. Advocates of
affirmative action admissions programs often admit that
African American law school applicants may not perform as
well as white applicants on standardized tests like the LSAT
and that their undergraduate GPAs may be lower, but these
lapses can be explained by a whole host of skills-related
factors. 154 Once African American applicants matriculate in law
school, however, the advocates of affirmative action programs
often reject special treatment for the newly registered students.
Instead, these advocates claim that African American students

152. See Cheryl E. Amana,Recruitment and Retention oftheAfricanAmericanLaw
Student, 19 N.C. CENT. L.J. 207, 214-16 (1991) (emphasizing the need for environmental as well as skill-related support services); Deasy, supra note 9, at 568 n.95
(recognizing the dangers to Black law students from extracurricular overload); see also
Melinda Henneberger, Escaping Mean Streets, a Student Still Struggles, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 18, 1994, at Bl (describing choices made by an African American college
student).
153. See supra notes 30-35, 41~0 and accompanying text (discussing the failure
to consider the effects of race on choice in Bostick and Croson).
154. See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 91, at 569 (citing poor urban schools and poor
. health care as reasons for poor African American academic performance in general).
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should be treated the same as white law students. 155 In doing
so, they are asserting that there are no differences between
African American and white law students that are significant
enough to require rethinking traditional legal education.
While proponents support affirmative action based on norms
of equality, opponents, including African American opponents,
often oppose it as violating the norms of color blindness. Opponents argue that all things being equal, it is not fair to prefer
African American applicants over white applicants. As William
Rasberry argues: "A black graduate of a black college ... who
scores 36 on the LSAT may strike the admissions officer of a
top-ranked law school as a diamond in the rough. But what of
the black applicant whose undergraduate school was Yale?" 156
The implication here is that if Yale is an applicant's undergraduate institution, then that applicant should be considered
the same as a white student, regardless of the color of the
applicant's skin.
Opponents of affirmative action also argue against it by
calling it "reverse discrimination." For example, Lino Graglia
asserts that "[t]he only point of contention" in considering
affirmative action programs is "whether it is appropriate and
desirable to grant preference to some applicants and, therefore,
to exclude others solely on the basis of race." 157 He concludes,
not surprisingly, that granting such a preference is not appropriate because the consideration of race constitutes "racial
· discrimination." 158 By redescribing affirmative action as discrimination, Graglia implies that African Americans and
whites are similarly situated, and that institutions that practice affirmative action are choosing people based on superficial
differences rather than merit. 159 This assumption of underlying,

155. Michel Marriott, Storm at Georgetown Law on Admissions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
17, 1991, at A14; Mary Roberts, Article lnfiames GU Law Center, THE HOYA, Apr. 19,
1991, at 1, 5; see also Charles E. Daye, On Blackberry Picking, Generation.s of
Affirmative Action, and Less Dangerous Enterprises: An Open Letter to Stephen Carter,
45 STAN. L. REV. 485, 488 (1993) (noting that law school simply provides African
American students with a chance to compete, regardless of the circumstances of
admission).
156. William Raspberry, Race and Fairness at Georgetown Law, WASH. POST, Apr.
19, 1991, at A23.
157. Lino A. Graglia, Race Norming in Law School Admissions, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC.
97, 99 (1992).
158. Id. at 102.
159. See RAND<>M HOUSE CoLLEGE DICTIONARY 379 (rev. ed.1975) (defining"discrimination" as "treatment or distinction not based on individual merit in favor of or
against a person, group, etc.").
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fundamental "sameness" fits with the ideology of color blindness in legal education and in the legal system.
Judge Posner argues for a similar view of affirmative action,
which he refers to "more bluntly, [as] reverse discrimination."160 Again, the use of the term "reverse discrimination,"
like Graglia's "racial discrimination," implies that the subjects
under consideration are fundamentally the same. But here, the
term undoubtedly receives part of its power because the word
"reverse" makes the reader wonder what "non-reverse" discrimination is. "Discrimination," unmodified, reminds us of the
claims of differential and inferior treatment of African Americans made by civil rights advocates during the 1950s and
1960s. In this historical context, the word "discrimination" was
used to imply a claim of sameness-that African Americans
were essentially the same as whites and entitled to the same
rights. 161 Posner's use of"reverse discrimination" draws on this
historical claim of equality from the Civil Rights era.
Judge Posner then argues against the use of affirmative
action in faculty hiring because faculty members hired under
such programs ultimately can be expected to receive unfavorable tenure decisions. According to him:
Not every competent untenured faculty member is expected
to get tenure .... What then are the tenure standards for
the affirmative action hires to be? If they are the same
tenure standards as for white males, then probably a
disproportionate number of blacks will not make tenure,
and this will be more than awkward. What is to be done?
Are there to be two tenure tracks? If so, will voting on
tenure in the affirmative action track be limited to
blacks? 162
Instead of attempting to answer any of the questions he poses,
Judge Posner changes the subject, moving to a discussion of
the problem of hiring entry level African American faculty. 163

160. Posner, supra note 124, at 1157 (responding to Kennedy, supra note 36); but
see Culp, supra note 93 (interpreting Judge Posner's argument as part of a continuing
effort of white scholars to dominate the legal academy).
161. For a discussion of the longstanding debate within the African American
community as to whether African Americans should assert a claim to equal inclusion
in white society or whether they should claim difference, see Peller, supra note 19.
162. Posner, supra note 124, at 1159-60.
163. Id. at 1160.
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Thus, he moves rapidly from "firing'' to "hiring" African American faculty, playing perhaps on the similarity between the two
words and what he sees as the natural relationship between
the two processes: those African American who are hired for
faculty positions eventually will have to be fired.
By leaving the question of tenure standards for African
American faculty unanswered, Judge Posner appears to believe
that the question is rhetorical. He expects the readers to
endorse the proposition that a standard that treats African
Americans as identical with whites is the right one, and
implies that hiring faculty pursuant to an affirmative action
plan will create awkward situations because African American
faculty will be unable to meet merit-based tenure standards.
Yet, Posner fails to consider the possibility of rethinking the
tenure standards themselves. In short, Judge Posner follows
a strategy of asserting that African Americans and whites
should be judged by the same standards for tenure, while
recognizing that African Americans perform poorly when
judged by those standards.
The dominant discourse for proponents and opponents of both
affirmative action and academic support programs may be one
that asserts that African American students and faculty are
the same as their white counterparts. There is, however, a
competing refrain that constructs African Americans as different, inferior, and dangerous. This construction of inferiority
derives from the claim of equality. Although academic support
programs use racially neutral language to describe eligible students, most academic support programs have a disproportionately low percentage of white students when compared to
the. law school's population. 164 As a result, even those programs
that do not formally define themselves in terms of the students'
race will serve vastly disproportionate numbers of African
American and other non-white students. This means that while
the programs may not be defined explicitly in terms of race,
they will be understood as being race-based. Furthermore,
academic support programs may not be able to provide the
flexible hours that nontraditional students might need or the
facilities and assistance that students with different abilities
might require for success. In fact, students often conclude that
164. For example, the Charles Hamilton Houston Program at the New England
School of Law routinely has an enrollment that is over 70% minority while the school
itself has a minority enrollment of under 10%. Conversation with Professor Robert
V. Ward, Administrator, Charles Hamilton Houston Program (Apr. 3, 1995).
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programs for "nontraditional" or "special needs" students are
race-based and thus complain of racial discrimination in being
disproportionately excluded from such programs. 165 The mere
existence of academic support programs that disproportionately
involve students of color emphasizes the present difference
between African American and white students while holding
out the hope for future sameness.
Racially neutral eligibility criteria for participation , in
academic support programs also serve to emphasize the African
American students' difference from other, predominantly white,
students. Labeling academic support program students as
being "nontraditional" or as having "special needs" simultaneously defines the non-academic support students as the
"traditional," "normal" students. These "traditional" students
become the model against which other students are measured.166 In this way, the language makes a claim that the
African American students are no different from others.:_
simply nontraditional, but so, perhaps, are some whites-and
simultaneously asserts the African American students' difference by setting them up against the model of the traditional
white student.
Like the discourse of affirmative action programs, their
pedagogy emphasizes African American students' difference.
Guidelines for support programs often encourage instructors
to use hypotheticals drawn from fact situations that are
thought to be of particular relevance to African American
communities. For example, one model program states: "[H]ypothetical examples [in the support program] should, to the
extent possible, reflect' the students' diverse life experiences
and cultural backgrounds."167 This is undoubtedly correct; hypotheticals in a support program should show the students how
law can be meaningful to them. Stressing hypotheticals of
particular relevance to African American communities in
support programs, however, implies that these same
hypotheticals would be of less relevance outside of academic
support classes-in regular classes dominated by white students.

165. Judith G. Greenberg & Robert V. Ward, Teaching Race and the Law through
Narrative, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming 1995).
166. See Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 14
(1989) (arguing that differences are only constructed in reference to a norm).
167. ACADEMIC AsSISTANCE PROGRAMS, supra note 142, at 28. The lives of the
students involved in the academic support program are described as "diverse," thus
indicating their difference from the "non-diverse," presumably white, students. See
supra text accompanying note 150.
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Another way in which the pedagogy of academic support
programs undermines its prime statement about color blindness is through an emphasis on the need to provide role models
for African American students. Academic support programs
often claim that one of their goals is "[flostering a sense of
competence and belonging" among the students involved. 168 As
one description of a model program notes, this is a "particularly
challenging [objective] in academic institutions where few role
models exist." 169 If African American law students were fundamentally the same as white law students and if the only
difference were the superficial difference in skill levels upon
entering law school, then the role model issue should not be a
problem. After all, there is no reason to think that all members
of current law faculty had high skill levels upon entering law
school. 170 Those faculty whose skill levels were once relatively
low may need to be encouraged to serve as mentors, but they
should already be there. White faculty who had low skill levels
as entering law students, or even as undergraduates, could
serve as role models.
The goal of making academic support students feel as if they
belong is challenging because the low skills category serves as
a substitute for race. The role models that these programs are
looking for are not those who received an award for "most
improved" whiie in law school, but rather those who are
African American. In fact, faculty members' skill levels upon
entering law school probably are irrelevant to their utility as
role models. 171 Thus, we deny African American students'
difference from white students by claiming that whatever
differences there may be are superficial and remediable; and
yet, we reinstate those differences and recognize their centrality by noting the need for African American role models.
The language of academic support programs not only serves
to identify the programs with race, setting their students apart

168. ACADEMIC AsSISTANCE PROGRAMS, supra note 142, at 2.
169. Id.
170. Almost 60% oflaw faculty hired in the 1980s had served on law review. Robert
J. Borthwick & Jordan R. Schau, Gatekeepers of the Profession: An Empirical Profile
of the Nation's Law Professors, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 191, 206 tbl. 7 (1991).
171. See Anita L. Allen, On Being a Role Model, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 22, 25,
30-31 (1990-1991) (arguing that Black women teachers can serve as role models for
Black female students because they have experienced racism and because they can
show students that Black women can succeed as intellectuals); Richard Delgado,
Affirmatiue Action as a Majoritarian Deuice: Or, Do You Really Want to be a Role
Model? 89 MICH. L. REV. 1222 (1991) (describing a role model's function as co-opting
students into the system).
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from the white students, it also marks the students as inferior.172 This is done through the discussion of the students' skill
deficiencies. Support programs, having diagnosed the African
American students' problems as ones of skill, seek to teach
students to read complex materials, to analyze or synthesize
these materials, to write or think like a lawyer, or to learn
independently. 173 In doing so, they imply that only the students
in the programs are lacking in these skills. One program
description, for example, says, "summer academic assistance
programs offer a valuable opportunity for [nontraditional]
students to prepare for the academic challenges presented in
law school." 174 This suggests that only "nontraditional" law students-African Americans or other students of color-will need
a whole summer of assistance to prepare for law school's
"challenges." Similarly, most academic year support programs
involve skills review, which assumes that the students in the
program are especially in need of this review. Finally, failure
to perform adequately, after completion of an academic support
program, may simply reinforce the message of inferiority.
Affirmative action programs function in the same w~y.
African American law students are marked as inferior to white
students simply by virtue of their inability to meet the normal
admissions standards that are based on the supposedly neutral
results of objective testing. 175 Stephen Carter argues that
affirmative action programs are undesirable for African Americans precisely because they cause African Americans to be
labeled as inferior. 176 According to Carter, such programs
choose among Blacks to locate the "best [B]lack"-a person
understood as unable to compete with the best person overall
for the job or class seat. 177 This reinforces "the durable and
demeaning stereotype of [B]lack people as unable to compete
with white ones." 178

172. Espinoza, supra note 125, at 286-90 (recognizing the dual message of support
programs as simultaneously one of support and stigma).
173. See supra notes 135-49 and accompanying text.
174. ACADEMIC AsSISTANCE PROGRAMS, supra note 142, at 27.
175. For a discussion of the gender and cultural biases of many LSAT test
questions, see Leslie G. Espinoza, The LSAT: Narratives and Bias, 1 AM. U. J. GENDER
& L. 121 (1993).
176. CARTER, supra note 27, at 47-69.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 50; see also Torry, supra note 93, at Al, A9 (asserting that "minority
students who gain entrance to the [law] school strictly on merit tend to be viewed as
if they had received preference").
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Not only do affirmative action and academic support programs portray African American students as inferior, they
depict African American students as dangerous to the white
students. African Americans often have been characterized as
threatening to whites. Throughout American history, African
Americans have been portrayed as violent toward the person
and property of whites. 179 Furthermore, the stereotype of the
highly sexually charged African American male and of the
lascivious African American female play prominent roles in the
white American imagination. 180 These stereotypes of violence
and sexuality evoke intertwined fears in whites for their
security and identities. The very presence of African Americans
179. For examples from literature, see Loyle Hairston, William Styron's Nat
Turner-Rogue-Nigger, in WILLIAM STYRoN'S NAT TURNER: TEN BLACK WRITERS RESPOND
70 (John Henrik Clarke ed., 1968) [hereinafter RESPONSE TO NAT TuRNER) (accusing
Styron of portraying the Turner revolt against slavery as "mere wanton savagery"
against whites); Charles V. Hamilton, Our Nat Turner and William Styron's Creation,
in· RESPONSE TO NAT TuRNER, supra, at 77 (describing Styron's Nat Turner as confirming
white America's racist beliefs that kindness to African Americans will simply be repaid
by murder). For examples from current news stories, see Crenshaw & Peller, supra
note 25, at 61 (emphasizing that the defense in the Rodney King case described King's
African American body, even while on the ground with baton blows raining down on
him, as "cocked" and "in a trigger position"); Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the
Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing as the Law's Response to Racism, 42 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 127, 137 (1987) (noting that local residents of Howard Beach felt that
the attack on three African Americans who had left their stalled car in an effort to
seek help was justified because the African Americans were in a white neighborhood
and it is better to be safe than sorry); Michael Grunwald, For Boston, Harsh Reminder: 5 Years Ago, Stuart's Racist Hoax Was Hatched-And Believed, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov.
4, 1994, at 17 (quoting Ozell Hudson of the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under
Law who said, in relation to the Charles Stuart and Susan Smith cases, "Black people
have always been stereotyped as criminals in this country, and it's clear that people
are still willing to believe those stereotypes"); Charles M. Sennott, Case Confirms
Some Fears of Racism in S.C. Town, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 6, 1994, at 22 (noting that
Susan Smith's and Charles Stuart's allegations that African American men were
responsible for violent crimes against whites, coupled with white America's willingness
to think of African American men as potentially criminal, resulted in the detention
or suspicion oflarge numbers of innocent African Americans in Union County, South
Carolina; and the Mission Hill area of Boston); see also Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa
Loquitur, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781, 787 (1994) (indicating that over 56% of Americans
believe African Americans to be violence prone).
180. See, e.g., HAzEL V. CARBY, REcoNSTRUCTING WOMANHOOD 27-39 (1987) (describing
the sexual stereotypes of Black women in antebellum southern literature); PATRICIA
HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT 166-73 (1991) (depicting the treatment of Black
women's bodies and sexuality as the foundation of modern pornography); JACQUELYN
Down HALL, REvOLT AGAINsr CHIVALRY: JESSIE DANIEL AMEs AND THE WoMEN's CAMPAIGN
AGAINST LYNCHING 145-47 (rev. ed. 1993) (discussing the widely held view in the South
at the turn of the century that African American men were "lustful black brutes");
Kimber le Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It Anyway?, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING
POWER 402, 411-14 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992) (discussing the effect of these myths on
societal response to rape and harassment of Black women).
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in law schools may prove dangerous for whites. The danger
derives from two sources. First, African Americans may wrest
from whites property to which whites are entitled. Second, the
mere existence of African American students in a predominantly white law school may imperil white identity by threatening
the purity of the school's standards and the quality of the
education that it provides.
Affirmative action programs routinely are understood as
depriving white applicants of seats in a class-seats to which
whites feel they are entitled. 181 This idea of white entitlement
underlies the recent controversy over the Georgetown University Law Center's admissions policy. On April 8, 1991, Timothy
Maguire, a third year student at Georgetown, wrote an opinion
piece for the school's newspaper claiming that African American law students' LSAT scores and undergraduate GPAs were
significantly lower than whites'. 182 The practice of preferential
admissions for African Americans, he asserted, "almost certainly creat[es] more serious problems than it ... solv[es]." 183
Maguire's article focused on LSAT scores, assuming that
those scores are neutral entrance criteria. 184 He devoted at
least half of his two-column article to a discussion of the LSAT
scores of Georgetown's African American and white applicants
and accepted students, and to the scores of students at the
historically Black schools of Howard, Morehouse, Hampton,
Jackson State, and Grambling. In the midst of this discussion
of scores, Maguire states that "[t]he biggest problem is that in
every area and at every level of postsecondary education black

181. For a full description this phenomenon, see Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as
Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1777-84 (1993); see also ELLIS COSE, THE RAGE OF
A PRIVILEGED CLASS 111-13 (1993); (analyzing the percentage of Blacks and Hispanics
who have been unfairly promoted over white males, as reported by a 1993 Newsweek
Magazine poll of white males, and asking why, if that poll is accurate, Blacks and
Hispanics on average earn less and hold lower positions than whites); Carl A.
Auerbach, The Silent Opposition of Professors and Graduate Students to Preferential
Affirmative Action Programs: 1969 and 1975, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1233, 1253 (1988)
(citing a 1975 survey which indicated that large numbers of white faculty and
students believed their own opportunities would be diminished by affirmative action
programs).
182. Timothy Maguire, Admissions Apartheid, GEO. L. WKLY., Apr. 8, 1991, at 5.
I am thankful to the administration of Georgetown, and particularly Laura A. Bedard,
Special Collections Librarian and Archivist, for making materials related to this
controversy available to me.
183. Id.
184. Id. But see Espinoza, supra note 175, at 127-38 (describing gender and
cultural bias of LSAT questions).
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achievements are far inferior to those ofwhites." 185 How he has
measured this inferiority is unclear. Presumably he believes
that it is indicated, at least in part, by the scores. 186
Maguire's argument against Georgetown's affirmative action
program is that it forces Georgetown to lower its admission
standards for African American applicants, not because they
have been harmed by a "lack of black role models" or a "hostile
environment" in their undergraduate educations, but because
African American applicants have lower grades and scores. 187
The implication is that whites are injured by affirmative action
programs like Georgetown's because such programs create
"artificial" preferences, rather than remedying past harms to
African Americans. 188 Maguire's use of the term "artificial"
implies that LSAT scores, in contrast, are "natural" sifting
criteria. A number of authors, however, have argued that the
LSAT is culturally biased toward white, upper middle class
students. 189
The claim of injury to whites was echoed by others who
commented on Maguire's article. One columnist worried about
the frustration and anger of white students who "wonder what
they did to have been denied ... admittance ... on account of
race." 190 A Georgetown law student remarked: "[E]very white
male here thinks that if he was black or a woman or some
other minority, they'd be at Harvard or Yale or some other
university .... That's not true, but that's the impression." 191
Another Georgetown law student noted that he believed
Maguire's objection to the affirmative action program was that

185. Maguire, supra note 182, at 5.
186. LSAT scores, however, do not measure educational achievement. The Law
School Admissions Service claims that the test "is designed to perform . . . the task
of predicting academic success in the first year of law school." LAW SCH. ADMISSION
SERVICES, THE LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION TEST: SOURCES, CONTENTS, USES 5 (1991).
187. Maguire, supra note 182, at 5.
188. See id.
189. See, e.g., Espinoza, supra note 175, at 134-38 (describing cultural bias of
LSAT questions); David M. White, Culturally Biased Testing and Predictive Invalidity:
Putting Them on the Record, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 89, 108-14 (1979) (arguing
that both the content of the questions and the mannering of administering the LSAT
are culturally biased against African Americans); see also Katherine Connor & Ellen
J. V argyas, The Legal Implications ofGender Bias in Standardized Testing, 7 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 13, 25 (1992) (recognizing that what might be seen as gender differences
in SAT performance may really be attributable to racial differences).
190. Richard Cohen, At Georgetown: Thboos ... , WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 1991, atA23.
191. Torry, supra note 93, at A9.
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it causes "white people [to] have a tougher road to hoe." 192 The
implication is that affirmative action programs do injury to
whites by depriving them of the class seats that, by right,
ought to be theirs.
Affirmative action programs also are portrayed as dangerous
to white students because they may cause a reduction in
intellectual standards. 193 An article written by Clyde Summers
in 1970 provides an example of this position. 194 Summers
claimed that it was a mistake to admit into law school minority
students with lower GPAs and LSAT scores than white students. According to him, preferential admissions programs
served only to move minority students from law schools at
which their scores would make them competitive, to law
schools whose expectations they simply could not meet. 195 As
a result, the very students who are to be helped by the admissions policies are in fact injured. Instead of competing equally
with their classmates, they are at an immediate disadvantage.19s

192. Reid Prouty, Letter to the Editor: In Support of Affirmative Action, GEO. L.
WKLY., Apr. 16, 1991, at 3. Prouty responds by arguing that "in the big scheme of
things, the unfairness that whites suffer here is trivial compared to what blacks do
across the board." Id. Another Georgetown law student noted that affirmative action
has its price but said that he, "as a white male, [was] willing to pay that price."
Saundra Torry, Affirmative Action a Flash Point at GU, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 1991,
at Dl, 06; cf Paul D. Carrington, Diversity! 1992 UTAH L. REV. 1105, 1106 (arguing
that the affirmative action movement seeks •a payment made by educational
institutions, at the expense of individuals seeking admission or employment, to
compensate members of groups said to be disadvantaged").
193. See Carrington, supra note 192, at 1134 (noting that a program to encourage
faculty to "investO more effort in mentoring [minority] students," along with the
admission ofless qualified students, could result in declines in the quality of teaching
and research); see also CARTER, supra note 27, at 26 (acknowledging the fear that
affirmative action programs cause a lowering of academic standards).
194. Clyde W. Summers, Preferential Admissions: An Unreal Solution to a Real
Problem, 1970 U. TOL. L. REV. 377. It is not my argument that Professor Summers was,
in 1970, in any way more racist than any of the white law school faculty who
supported affirmative action admissions programs. Summers describes his own pain
at raising questions about the value of the programs:
To raise questions about this program in which so many so deeply believe almost
inevitably leads to misunderstanding, no matter how hard one tries to make
himself understood. More troublesome, what one writes may be seized upon and
used by those who seek excuses for doing nothing and thus preserving the
present pattern of deprivation.

Id. at 380.
195. Id. at 394-95.
196. Id. at 381-85.
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Even assuming that lower grades and LSAT scores actually
reflect a lower level of skills, there are two possible responses
to Summers' argument. The first is that teaching could be
aimed at the capabilities of the less competent group of students. This would ensure that they are able to learn; the more
able students presumably would have no trouble learning. The
second possibility-the one that Summers simply assumed is
the correct practice-is to aim the class at the more advanced
level, leaving the other students scrambling to keep up. Summers saw this as damaging to the egos of the less advanced
students who would always feel inferior. 197
The question is, ifthe second option has this negative effect,
why did Summers. reject the first possibility without even
considering it? It is here that the possibility of"taint" emerges.
Summers assumed that the law schools that are most selective
in their admissions are also the most demanding in their
educational standards and are "better" law schools. 198 Following
his analysis, the presence of minority law students at these
schools is "dangerous" to white law students-the "better"
students-because their presence pressures the institution to
work at what Summers perceives to be the lower level of the
minority students. 199 Responses to this pressure will result in
an inferior education for the more able students. Consequently,
the presence of African American students is dangerous to
white students who presumably are able to perform at the
higher level.
Special admission programs justify their existence in part on
the grounds that high institutional standards will not be
affected. Instead, students admitted according to the "special"
criteria are cabined off. One educational process is used for
them; another for students admitted in the "regular" manner.
Thus, in schools with affirmative action programs, academic
support programs function to reassure white law school constituencies that the school's standards and norms will remain

197. Id. at 395-96.
198. The students in these "better" schools will, he says, have a greater "verbal
facility and much more highly developed skills in manipulating ideas." Id. at 395.
Since the class will move at the level of these students, the student who was admitted
with lower scores will be left behind. Id.
199. Cf Amana, supra note 152, at 216 ("Under no circumstances should a school
consider lowering overall academic standards ....");Carrington, supra note 192, at
1134-35 (noting that some programs to encourage diversity may, because of the
admission of less qualified students, result in declines in the quality of teaching and
research).
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unpolluted. Although seeming to be a means ofintegrating law
school classes, these programs ultimately function as a means
of containing the dangers African Americans may pose, thereby
maintaining white purity and segregation. 200
These multiple discourses about African American law
students both exist within and reinforce the present structure
of legal education. They do this in two ways. First, the discourse of color blindness supports a belief in law school as a
meritocracy, while the discourse of deviance and danger leaves
legal academics unsurprised when African American students
fail. Second, the ideology of color blindness claims that decisions, including curricular decisions, should be made without
reference to race. If African Americans are assumed to be the
same as whites, then it is sufficient to discuss only whites in
the classroom. Nothing would be added by discussing African
Americans. The result is that legal education has needed to
change very little to accommodate the presence of African
Americans. 201 The ideology of race-blind equality supports the
maintenance of the status quo, as does the possibility of
African American difference and inferiority. Neither of these
discourses admits the possibility of difference without inferiority. That possibility, discussed in the next Part, would require
a reassessment of whether legal education is biased against
African Americans.

IV. AFRICAN AMERICAN LAW STUDENTS AND DIFFERENCE
A system of legal education structured around the assumption that African American students are either the same as
whites or inferior to whites is likely to place any African
American students who understand themselves as different,
but not inferior, at a serious disadvantage. For these students,

200. This is very similar to the role that tracking has played in integrated public
schools. See, e.g., Jeannie Oakes, Tracking in Mathematics and Science Education:
A Structural Contribution to Unequal Schooling, in CLASS, RACE, GENDER IN AMERICAN
EDUCATION 106, 112-19 (Lois Weis ed., 1988) (noting that poor and minority students
often are placed in remedial classes at an early age, which may result in a limitation
of those students' opportunities and may contribute to their lower academic outcomes).
201. See Anthony J. Scanlon, The History and Culture ofAffirmative Action, 1988
B.Y.U. L. REV. 343, 351 (stating that summer support programs of the mid-1960s were
popular in part because they did not require curricular change).
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their identities as African Americans 202 may conflict with the
white or inferior identities imposed on them by law schools.
They may understand that while law and legal education make
claims to be blind to race, law students-African American and
white-are taught that race counts in a variety of ways.
I consider here three characteristics described frequently in
studies of African American cultures and identity: (1) the
organic nature of African American communities; (2) a distinct
oral linguistic tradition; and (3) a sense of alienation from and
opposition to the dominant white culture. I am not claiming
that these characteristics have a definitional priority over
others, 203 but only that these are important to some African
Americans' sense of self. This Part will show that the structure
oflegal education particularly disadvantages African American
law students whose identities are defined in relation to these
characteristics. 204 For these students, legal education presents
distinct obstacles that are not present for white students with
different understandings of their own identities. 205 In short, it

202. The culture of law school also may make legal education more difficult for
others who do not identify themselves with its traditional norms. These may include
Hispanics, Asian Americans, white women, and poor men and women regardless of
race. A discussion of the problems faced by these groups, however, is outside of the
scope of this Article. In order to determine the extent of any bias in legal education
against people from these groups, it would be necessary to explore the cultures that
form each of them, similar to the preliminary exploration of African American cultures
in this section.
I also want to be clear that I am not claiming that there is a single, monolithic,
African American culture. Gender, class, geographic area, and national origin, among
other factors, are all critical to any discussion of African American identities. For
examples of the ways in which such factors are important, see Walter R. Allen, The
Color ofSuccess: African-American College Student Outcomes at Predominantly White
and Historically Black Public Colleges and Universities, 62 HARV. EDUC. REV. 26, 28-32
(1992) (discussing findings on the relative performances of African Americans in
college); Signithia Fordham & John U. Ogbu, Black Students' School Success: Coping
with the "Burden of 'Acting White'», 18 URB. REV. 176, 193-98 (1986) (describing
gender differences in the ways African American high school students cope with school
success and the social difficulties it fosters among their peers). I recognize that for
some African American students, the "white" identity constructed for them by the
legal academy and their own sense of identity may be sufficiently similar that there
may not be problems.
203. See generally RoBERT c. SMITH & RICHARD SELTZER, RACE, Cl.Ass, AND CULTURE:
A STUDY IN AFRo-AMERICAN MAss OPINION (1992) (discussing African American religion,
alienation, civic attitudes, and ideology).
204. This methodology draws on that used by Mary Joe Frug. Frug, supra note 98,
at 1070-74 (imagining multiple "readers" and their responses to a casebook).
205. Similarly, Sheila Foster notes that the melting pot ideal requires only some
people to give up their racially-related identities. Sheila Foster, Difference and
Equality: A Critical Assessment of the Concept of"Diversity», 1993 WIS. L. REV. 105,
151.
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is the goal of this Part to show that legal education is not
culturally neutral.

A. Organic Communities
Understanding African American communities as organic
means picturing them, as Regina Austin does, as places where
"everyone would be a resource, especially those whom the
dominant society would write off as having little or nothing to
contribute. "206 According to this admittedly idealized vision,
African American communities draw an important portion of
their strength and meaning from all of their members; the
members in turn draw their identity from the community. 207
Many aspects of African American culture contribute to its
organic nature. Anthony Cook described religious conversion
in African American communities as providing "a process in
which personalities disintegrated by the social chaos of oppression found meaning and commonality by fusing with others
in a collective act of self-affirmation and even defiance." 208
Similarly, the call and response form, often used in African
American religion and music, "embodies an interlocking and
synergistic dimension, in which members of the group participate by adding their own voice to those of others, to serve both
as counterpoint and counterforce ... until collective spiritual
release and regeneration is achieved. "209 The close, organic

206. Regina Austin, "The Black Community,» Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of
Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769, 1799 (1992).
207. Id. at 1775.
208. Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theology
ofDr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 HARV. L. REV. 985, 1022 (1990) (citation omitted);

CHARI.Es P. HENRY, CULTURE AND AFRICAN AMERICAN PoLITICS 61-75 (1990) (noting
that many African American faiths believe that Blacks are a chosen people).
209. THOMAS KocHMAN, BLACK AND WHITE STYLES IN CoNF1JCT 109 (1981). For discussions of the call and response form in African American music, see ROGER D.
ABRAHAMS, TALKING BLACK 83 (1976); HENRY, supra note 208, at 34 (rap); LAWRENCE W.
LEVINE, BLACK CULTURE AND BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS 232 (1977) (blues).
The community's response to a performance often is crucial to African American
performers, who use it as a way of assessing what their performance has meant to
the audience. GENEVA SMITHERMAN, TALKIN AND TESTIFYIN: THE LANGUAGE OF BLACK
AMERICA 110-18 (1977). Reportedly Ethel Waters, who was used to performing before
African American audiences, thought she had failed before a white audience because:
"Nobody stomped as they always do in colored theaters when I finish my act. Nobody
screamed or jumped up and down. Nobody howled with joy." LEVINE, supra, at 233
(quoting Ethel Waters).

see also
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nature of many African American communities also is reinforced by the frequent use of "brother" and "sister" to refer to
members of the community. 210
Students whose identities are formed, at least partially,
through their connection to the African American community
may feel that law school challenges their very selves. They may
feel excluded from participating in African American community activities, and thus from being African American, by the
time demands and competitiveness of law school culture. Lois
Weis notes that academic success for African American students, at least in the community college setting which she
studied, generally means rejecting the community's immediate
demands for assistance. 211 The students she studied understood
that success in school meant letting go of the street community. 212 These community college students found this bearable
because they intended to use their educations as a means of
moving away from their communities. 213

210. See BEIL HOOKS, SlsTERs OF THE YAM: BLACK WOMEN AND SELF-REcOVERY 13 (1993)
(using "sister" and "yam" to emphasize kinship and community among African
American women).
Carol B. Stack's discussion of the support that Black women on welfare provide to
one another is yet another example of the organic nature of the Black women's
community. CAROL B. STACK, ALL OUR KIN 34-40 (1974); see also Haney-Lopez, supra
note 124, at 50-53 (discussing the effects of community ties on world perspectives).
African American communities of course also may have individualistic aspects. See
S. Rhett Jones, Rugged Black Individualism: Eighteenth Century Causes-Twentieth
Century Consequences, 1 J. PAN AFR. STUD. 1, 1, 3-7 (1990) (arguing against the
common perception "that black Americans are a communalistic folk" and asserting
that black Americans are in fact individualistic and self-reliant as a result of their
experiences as slaves); see also JAY MACLEOD, AIN'T No MAKIN' IT 141 (1987) (noting that
African American students and parents often accept the achievement ideology of the
educational system). Students whose African American identities are tied to the norm
of achievement may feel less like they are under attack in law school. Nevertheless,
law schools' structural biases against African American law students-very little
classroom discussion of African Americans, choice of written work as the major
evaluative criteria-are likely to work against these students as well.
211. LOIS WEIS, BETWEEN Two WORLDS 126 (1985). Weis's study shows how the
community college's attendance policy, for example, was at odds with the fluid understanding of time on the street; compliance with the attendance policy would prevent
meaningful participation in the collective life and obligations of the street. Id. at
77-82. Yet not all students were required to reject their underclass community in
order to succeed. Older women who earned associate degrees in secretarial science
or child care could participate in college while remaining outside of the student
culture and maintaining their community ties. Furthermore, upon completing their
Associate of Arts degrees, their wages would be low enough to require them to remain
within the community. Income from employment in one of those fields would simply
supplement the resources otherwise available in the kin networks. Id. at 126.
212. Id. at 17-21.
213. Id. at 20.

100

UmveT'Sity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 28:1

In contrast to the students that Weis studied, some African
American law students may have chosen law school because
they wish to use their legal skills to assist their communities. 214 While in law school, they are likely to be physically
separated from these communities. Students whose identities
are closely tied to helping their communities may turn to the
subject matter of their courses for support for their identities.
These students' reasons for coming to law school likely will be
undermined by the significant lack of information available in
most law school curricula on issues that would be important
to African American communities. 215
James McPherson's description of his class at Harvard Law
School in the late 1960s illustrates this response:
It has always bothered me that three very bright black

students, two from excellent Ivy League colleges and the
third from one of the best black colleges, flunked out after
our first year at Harvard. . .. One of the men obviously
preferred to read literature much more than to read law.
The other two had a very keen sense of obligation to what
was called in those days "the civil rights movement." Both
had been highly active in civil rights affairs before coming
to law school-in fact, one man came to Harvard directly
from a Mississippi jail-and both worked in civil liberties
organizations at the law schooi during that first year ....
Were these two men looking for some immediate relationship between su,bjects which required most of their time
and the social situations which they had agreed to leave for
a while? If one assumes that they sincerely sought relevance, it is possible to see, or at least speculate on, why
they did not succeed during that first year. The answer
seems simple: they failed to recognize that the study oflaw
214. See, e.g., GRANFIELD, supra note 81, at 39 (quoting the son of an African
American minister, who went to law school so that he could provide legal counsel to
his father's church); see also David B. Wilkins, Two Paths to the Mountaintop?, 45
STAN. L. REV. 1981 (1993) (arguing that African American law students and lawyers
owe moral obligations to African American communities). The question of the relation
of African American intellectuals to African American communities is a long-standing
issue. For discussions of this issue, see HAROLD CRUSE, THE CRISIS OF THE NEGRO
INTELLECTUAL (1967); see also Deborah W. Post, Reflections on Identity, Diversity and
Morality, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 136, 158-64 (1990-1991) (discussing the morality
of Black assimilation into the white culture); Forum: On the Responsibility of
Intellectuals, BOSTON REV., Jan./Feb. 1993, at 22 (reporting on a transcript from part
of a forum on the future of the urban poor).
215. See supra text accompanying notes 94-101.
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has no immediate relevance to the black community. It is
almost pure study. The real relevance comes only after the
period of training . . . ·. 216
The current substance oflegal education does not provide much
more sustenance for an African American law student looking
for discussions of issues of relevance to the African American
communities than it did in the 1960s. An African American law
student looking for this type of information will find it only in
the most hidden nooks and crannies of the core courses. 217 A
white, middle class student, by contrast, will find that most
courses, most of the time, deal with the communities from
which he comes and with the business or personal issues of
relevance to those communities.
Furthermore, African American students may even experience difficulty visualizing themselves in the settings or transactions described in class.
Consider discussions of probable cause where the reasonableness of an officer's suspicion requires students to view
the situation through the eyes of the arresting officer. It is
not unusual for professors to base a hypothetical on the
presence of a Black person in a white neighborhood ....
[T]he minority student is essentially required to look back
at herself to determine whether her own presence in a
white neighborhood would· be sufficient cause for her to
arrest herself. 218
African American students may find it easier to see themselves on the subordinate side, rather than on the dominant
side, of a transaction between police and suspect, seller and
purchaser, landlord and tenant, bureaucrat and benefits
216. McPherson, supra note 99, at 96. Arguing, as McPherson does, that African
American law students should see law school simply as an interruption in their
connection to the community-that they will be able to return to it with renewed vigor
upon graduation-is a recognition of their difference from white students. First, it may
turn out that law school cannot be merely an "interruption." The amount of time
African American students spend in law school on white subjects and under the
assumption that they themselves are just like white law students may affect their
very identities. African American students who see this as a possibility and wish to
prevent it will have to work simply to maintain their identities. Second, even ifit were
true that law school is simply an interruption in African American students' lives,
white students have no similar period in which their sense of self must be put on hold.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 94-99.
218. Crenshaw, supra note 89, at 4 (citations omitted).
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recipient, corporate tortfeasor and victim. These subordinate
positions are likely to evoke strong emotions on the part of the
students. White students, like "objective" white scholars, may
be able to "remain cool and distant in the face of suffering or
anger because it is not their liberation, their humanity, which
is at stake." 219 To ask many of the African American students
to do the same may be to ask them to deny their identities as
they have been formed in relation to their conceptions of
African American communities. 220
Not only are some African American students prevented from
studying the very subjects that are crucial to their sense of who
they are, but they are forced to study, as if they were white,
subjects that assume their whiteness. As a result, it seems
likely that at least some of those African American students
whose identities are formed in relation to their communities
will try to maintain or create ties with African American
communities, either within or outside of the law school. 221 This
is a way ofresisting the law school's effort to make them white.
African American students often participate in the Black
American Law Students Association (BALSA) or community
organizations near the law school, tutor other law students or
students in the local schools, or become leaders in their
church. 222 Although it is hard to obtain information about
African American students' activities on behalf of the community, African American faculty have not been shy about describing the frequent conflicts that they experience in trying

219. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Word and the River: Pedagogy as Scholarship
as Struggle, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2231, 2238 (1992).
220. It is important to recognize that the African American communities with
which students identify may have mythic as well as real components to them. Regina
Austin describes the communities' legendary aspects:
There exists out there, somewhere, "the black community." ... [l]t is more of
an idea, or an ideal, than a reality .... "The black community" of which I write
is partly the manifestation of a nostalgic longing for a time when ... concern
about the welfare of the poor was more natural than our hairdos.
Austin, supra note 206, at 1769.
221. This, of course, is not a characteristic that is limited to African American
students. Others have argued that women's identities are often derived from their
sense of caring for and responsibility to others. See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT
VOICE: PsYCHOLOGICAL THEoRY AND WOMEN's DEvELoPMENT (1982); Suzanna Sheny, Civic
Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543,
584-90 (1986).
222. See Espinoza, supra note 125, at 291.
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to serve the local African American communities while at the
same time meeting the demands of the law school. 223
Participation in community activities may help African
American students recover their sense of communal identity
and self-worth; these endeavors, however, often require precious hours that otherwise could be spent studying. 224 When
African American students are cautioned not to undertake too
many extracurricular obligations, they may respond by arguing
that law school should be kept in perspective-there are "real
world" problems that require immediate attention. In structuring their lives around these problems, and in downplaying the
importance of academics, the students establish the fundamentals of a culture ofresistance. This culture may simultaneously
make it possible for them to survive law school and make such
survival more difficult.
The effort to recreate community where there is none also
may cause some African American law students to identify
with their African American law school peers in situations in
which such identification can be dangerous to their own
academic success. An African American student whose own
identity is structured by a sense of belonging to a community
may feel personally injured, discouraged, or angry if another
African American student does not perform as well as hoped
in law school. 225 The student may experience personal failure
for not having done more to prevent the friend's troubles.

223. See, e.g., Derrick Bell, Strangers in Academic Paradise: Law Teachers ofColor
in Still White Schools, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 385, 394 (1986) (describing some minority
law teachers who give up all other duties in favor of working with minority law
students); Roy L. Brooks, Life After Tenure: Can Minority Law Professors Avoid the
Clyde Ferguson Syndrome?, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 419, 420-24 (1986) (recognizing the
various demands made on minority faculty members' time by law students and
community leaders); Delgado, supra note 101, at 355-56 (noting that a survey found
that nearly two-thirds of minority law faculty reported feeling acute time pressure,
often as a result of demands placed on them to counsel minority students, to
participate in law school committees, or to speak to minority groups).
224. See Deasy, supra note 9, at 553 n.36 (describing the fears of an African
American law professor who, after studying the poor performance of African American
law students, was concerned that these students may be rejecting the goal of
developing necessary legal skills "in favor of directing their energies toward achieving
popularity and social success").
225. This is an experience that we noted frequently at New England School of Law
during a period in the 1980s in which a substantial percentage of our African
American students were academically dismissed each year. The remaining African
American students, even those who had performed quite well, would be fearful, angry,
and discouraged, as if they themselves were the ones who had performed poorly.
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Conversely, African American law students may believe that
others' success rides on theirs and be overwhelmed by this
responsibility in a setting in which teachers invariably push
students to the point where they must admit that they do not
know the answer. James McPherson poignantly described these
feelings of shared identity among Black law students, drawing
from his own experiences in the late 1960s:
The silence, the heavy sense of expectation, fell on all of the
blacks in a classroom whenever one of us was called upon
for an answer. We waited, with the class, for the chosen
man to justify the right of all of us to be there. And the
busy silence between the time a black student was called
on and the time he began to make an answer was alive
with all our answers being pushed, by sad attempts at
some kind of empathy, from all sections of the huge room
to the mind of the man who, for the moment, represented
all of us .... And when an answer came, however poor it
was, there would be relief . . . audible in the renewed
breathing of the rest of the black students. 226
For African American law students who feel the weight of the
community on their shoulders every time they speak, the
stakes are higher than they are for ·students who do not feel
this way.
It is not surprising that these students venture fewer voluntary answers and generally participate less frequently in
order to reduce the risks of failing their communities. it also
is not surprising that they venture fewer answers and participate less because the information provided makes less sense
to them than it does to their white counterparts. If the African
American students can neither visualize themselves in the
transactions described nor see the value of the information
provided for their communities, it will be harder for them to
learn than for the white students who are familiar with the
people and events described and with the communities that

226. McPherson, supra note 99, at 99; see also Margalynne Armstrong, Meditations
on Being Good, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 43, 43 (1990-1991) (recounting a Black
woman student's comment to the author, a Black woman, during her first week as a
law professor: "Girl, you'd better be good"); Emma C. Jordan, Images of Black Women
in the Legal Academy, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 5 (1990-1991) (portraying Black
women faculty's sense of shared identity with one of their number who had been
publicly criticized).
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value them. Similarly, students who feel the need to divide
their time between their communities and the law school are
not likely to do as well because law school makes heavy demands on student time and provides relatively few opportunities for part-time study.

B. Oral Linguistic Tradition
Legal education's emphasis on written work in a heavily
analytic style also may place some African American students
at a distinct disadvantage. Recent studies have claimed that
African American communities often have a strong and distinctive tradition of oral language that emphasizes narratives
and poetics. 227 Thus, asking African American students to
transform their use oflanguage from its primarily oral, playful
style to the written, analytical style of legal education is
essentially asking these students to change their identities.
Henry Louis Gates, in his pathbreaking work, The Signifying
Monkey, asserts that it is the African American rhetorical
tradition that distinguishes African American culture from
white culture. 228 This tradition includes the telling and retelling of numerous folktales, 229 the language of song, 230 the
strategic use of emotional force, 231 and the practice of signifying.232 The emphasis and skill in signifying is on style-the use

227. ABRAHAMS, supra note 209, at 36; HENRY L. GATES, JR., THE SIGNIFYING MONKEY: A THEORY OF AF'RO-AMER.ICAN LITERARY CRrrlCISM (1988); KocHMAN, supra note 209;
SMITHERMAN, supra note 209, at 77; Paul H. Lorenz, Cultural Rhetorics I Legal
Rhetoric: Teaching Appropriate Strategies for Legal Discourse, 16 T. MARsHALL L. REV.
623, 630-31 (1991); Kellis E. Parker, Ideas, Affirmative Action and the Ideal University, 10 NOVA L. REV. 761, 776 (1986); cf RoBERT B. STEPI'O, FRoM BEHIND THE VEIL (1979)
(arguing that African Americans have a long tradition of written narratives).
228. GATES, supra note 227, at 45; see also Lorenz, supra note 227, at 628-29
(discussing the need for African Americans to learn a new language in order to
"'com[e] to terms' with the dominant culture").
229. See, e.g., RoGER D. ABRAHAMS, DEEP DOWN IN THE JUNGLE (1970) (a study of
modern urban folklore); BooK OF NEGRO FOLKLORE (Langston Hughes & Arna Bontemps
eds., 1958) (a collection of traditional folktales); BRUCE JACKSON, "GET YOUR Ass IN THE
WATER AND SWIM LIKE ME" (1974) (a study and collection of narrative poetry).
230. See, ·e.g., LEVINE, supra note 209, at 158-297 (discussing the importance of
song to Black slave and free communities).
231. See KOCHMAN, supra note 209, at 108-16.
232. To signify is to "engage in certain rhetorical games .... " GATES, supra note
227, at 48. African American folksongs often conveyed meaning indirectly, LEVINE,
supra note 209, at 242-46, 320-44, while much African American humor allowed
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of words and phrases with dexterity. 233 As Gates says, "one
does not signify something; one signifies in some way ."234
The power and elegance of signifying come from the reuse of
familiar words that carry with them their past meanings. The
power of the words comes from their sound-for example,
rhyming is important-as well as from the multiple meanings
that the words carry. 235 In this way it is diametrically opposed
to the analytic style of legal writing in which meaning is
circumscribed and limited. According to Gates, the African
American tradition of signifying orally thus marks "its sense
of difference from the rest of the English community of speakers."236 For those African Americans who are in this tradition,
the oral heritage and the practice of signifying define their
identities: "The mastery ofSignifyin[g] creates homo rhetoricus
African us ."237
Students whose linguistic patterns and identities have been
formed by this African American oral tradition may find
themselves at a particular disadvantage in law school. To the
student who is schooled in the oral tradition, law school's
emphasis on a particular form of written work may appear
hostile. Legal writing puts a premium on the concise, analytical
use of words. 238 Extraneous words are discouraged, in part
African American people to be simultaneously actors and observers of themselves.
Spirituals often referred simultaneously to a world after death and to the trials of
slavery and the hopes and plans for escape. DANIEL KINGMAN, AMERICAN MUSIC: A
PANORAMA 38-39 (1979).
233. Claudia Mitchell-Kernan gives an example of the practice of signifying. She
describes an incident in which Grace, who had four children, was unhappy to discover
herself to be pregnant again. One day, after Grace's pregnancy had begun to show,
but before Grace had announced her pregnancy, her sister Rochelle came to visit her.
Mitchell-Kernan describes the following conversation as an example of signifying:
Rochelle: Girl, you sure do need to join the Metrecal for lunch bunch.
Grace: (non-committally) Yea, I guess I am putting on a little weight.
Rochelle: Now look here, girl, we both standing here soaking wet and you still
trying to tell me it ain't raining.
Claudia Mitchell-Kernan, Signifying, in MOTHER WIT FROM THE LAUGHING BARREL 310,
318-19 (Alan Dundes ed., 1973).
234. GATES, supra note 227, at 54.
235. An example of this multiplicity of meanings is the term "to signify" itself. This
term empties the word of its standard (white) content, which is "to mean," but does
not substitute its opposite. In thus declaring its difference from standard (white)
usage, the term itself now signifies. GATES, supra note 227, at 46-47.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 75.
238. See Lawrence, supra note 219, at 2278-79 (contrasting legal writing style with
the Black tradition of storytelling).
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because they have the potential for conveying multiple, unexplored meanings. Students rarely are encouraged to develop.
their own style. 239 In fact, style is relatively unimportant; it can
come later. Instead, students are expected to parse their cases
to identify the legal facts and rules that relate to the particular
narrow issue before them.
The African American oral tradition, in contrast, glories in
exactly those aspects oflanguage that the legal style excludes:
emotion, exaggeration, double entendre, and a whole range of
tropes. 24°For a student who has found her voice within the oral
tradition, the requirements oflegal writing will be tantamount
to writing in a different voice. This is consistent with Gates's
claim that the African American oral tradition is a signifying
mark of difference between African American and white
communities. 241
The importance of this mark cannot be overstated. 242 If some
African American students begin law school with a specific
style of communicating that for them is tied to their identities
as African Americans, and if law school requires a drastically
different style of communication that is identical to the style
already possessed by some white students, it should not be
surprising that law faculties often find that these African
American students have trouble with legal writing. Furthermore, if the student's style of communication is an integral
part of the student's identity as an African American, then
changing that student's writing style will require a change in
the student's self. The student may perceive the process of
learning to write like a lawyer as simultaneously forcing the
student to become white. 243
239. See CHARLES R CALLEROS, LEGAL METHOD AND WRITING 71-72 (1990); GERTRUDE
BLOCK, EFFECTIVE LEGAL WRITING 29-31 (3d ed. 1986).
240. See GATES, supra note 227, at 44-51.
241. Id. at 46-47.
242. It may, for example, help to explain the plagiarism of which Martin Luther
King, Jr. has been accused. For discussions of this, see KEITH D. MILLER, VOICE OF
DELIVERANCE: THE LANGUAGE OF MARTIN L. KING., JR. AND ITS SoURCES (1992); Clayborne
Carson et al., Martin Luther King, Jr., as Scholar: A Reexamination ofHis Theological
Writings, 78 J. AM. HIST. 93 (1991); David J. Garrow, King's Plagiarism: Imitation,
Insecurity, and Transformation, 78 J. AM. HIST. 86 (1991); Martin Luther King, Jr.,
Papers Project, The Student Papers ofMartin Luther King, Jr.: A Summary Statement
on Research, 78 J. AM. HIST. 23 (1991); Keith D. Miller, Martin Luther King, Jr., and
the Black Folk Pulpit, 78 J. AM. HIST. 120 (1991).
243. CARTER, supra note 27, at 26 (noting a student complaint that in order to be
invited to join the law review, African American students must learn to write like
white males); see also Signithia Fordham, Racelessness as a Factor in Black Students'
School Success: Pragmatic Strategy or Pyrrhic Victory?, 58 HARV. EDUC. REV. 54 (1988)
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Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that learning
to write like a lawyer may be a particularly complicated and
painful process for some African American students. For these
students, legal education and legal writing are not simply a
matter of acquiring new skills, they are a matter of acquiring
a new racial identity. Law school faculties' failure to acknowledge the particular obstacles placed in front of African American students whose identities are formed by an oral culture
makes it more difficult for them to teach these African
American students to write successfully. In this setting, the
claim that African American and white law students are
essentially the same is not only wrong, but also may contribute
to the creation of writing standards that place significant burdens on African American students while easing white students'
way.
Similarly, the choice to evaluate students almost entirely
through their written work may operate to the benefit of white
students and to the disadvantage of African American students. Not only do some African American writing styles differ
significantly from the acceptable legal style, but skill areas in
which these same students might have an advantage over
white students are not examined. The African American oral
style described above, because of the multiplicity of meanings
that a listener can take from a statement, can be persuasive
in both African American and white communities. For example,
by using portions from texts that make up white America's
history-patriotic songs, philosophical tracts, or religious
pieces-Martin Luther King, Jr., was able to present a "pastiche"244 that moved African Americans and simultaneously
sounded familiar and powerful, but not threatening, to many
white Americans. 245 Certainly, it is useful for lawyers of any
race to have this ability to persuade in their repertoire. The

(arguing that African American students who succeed in school often utilize a strategy
ofrejecting their racial identity and adopting one of"racelessness"); Fordham & Ogbu,
supra note 202, at 182 (noting that the culture of African American school children
defines as "white" certain activities, including the mastering of the standard academic
skills).
244. GATES, supra note 227, at xxvi-xxvii (using the term "pastiche" to describe
a form of signifying that is a "joyous proclamation of antecedent ... texts").
245. See MILLER, supra note 242, at 11-12 (attributing King's success at mobilizing
middle America in part to his use of the idiom of white preachers); Carson et al., supra
note 242, at 102-03 (recognizing the role that King's appropriation of others' words
may have played in mobilizing white Americans); Miller, supra note 242, at 121-23
(describing the multiple meanings of King's speeches).
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exclusion of this dynamic oral style biases legal education
against students whose senses of self are tied to this particular
oral tradition and in favor of those who identify with and are
skilled in the white, middle class tradition of the analytic
written word.
C. Alienation

A third cultural characteristic that distinguishes some
African Americans from white Americans is the former's
alienation from the dominant American culture. 246 More than
seventy years ago, W.E.B. Du Bois recognized the role this
feeling of alienation played in the formation of African American identities:
[T]he Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and
gifted with second-sight in this American world,-a world
which yields him no true self-consciousness, but only lets
him see himself through the revelation of the other world.
It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this
sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of
others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that
looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his
two-ness,-an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts,
two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark
body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn
asunder. 247
Studies show that the theme of alienation from white society
and resulting mistrust of that society resonates in many

246. RoY L. BROOKS, RETHINKING THE AMERICAN RACE PROBLEM 40-41 (1990); SMITH

& SELTZER, supra note 203, at 142 (identifying the sense of alienation as a trait that
cuts across class lines among African Americans and distinguishes African American
culture in the United States); Cheryl I. Harris, Law Professors of Color and the
Academy: Of Poets and Kings, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 331 (1992) (discussing the
alienation African American law professors experience); Donald K. Hill, Linguistic
Thought and Behavior: Sociolinguistic Considerations in Multicultural Legal
Education, 16 T. MARsHALL L. REV. 571, 579 (1991) (arguing that African American
linguistic thought works to alienate African Americans in American society).
24 7. W.E.B. Du BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 8-9 (Vintage Books 1986) (1903);
see also Lawrence, supra note 219, at 2239, 2270-77 (describing the importance of this
feeling of alienation in African American writers' work).
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aspects of African American culture. 248 Martin Luther King, Jr.,
exhibited a feeling of alienation in accusing ,white America of
having "given the Negro a bad check; it has come back marked
'insufficient funds.' "249 African-American folklore always has
exalted tricksters like Brer Rabbit, 250 while a major theme of
blues music is that others are not to be trusted. 251 This sense
of alienation also affects African Americans' perceptions of the
educational process. John Ogbu has characterized the relationship between minorities and the public schools as one of
"conflict and distrust." 252 Similarly, Lois Weis interviewed
African American community college students who believed
that they were being intentionally cheated out of a first-rate
education. 253

248. See, e.g., BROOKS, supra note 246, at 40-41 (describing the sense of alienatiOn
among the African-American middle class); SMITH & SELTZER, supra note 203, at 121-22
(describing anthropological studies suggesting that African-American interpersonal
alienation may be more than a class phenomenon, and speculating that it is a cultural
phenomenon); Hill, supra note 246, at 580 ("Black people, consciously and unconsciously, are forced by political tradition to live in terror of possible sanctions that can
be exercised against them collectively should the Nation decide not to honor its
commitment to racial coexistence.").
249. SMITH & SELTZER, supra note 203, at 121.
250. Id.
251. Id. (citing as an example B.B. King's 1970s song entitled "Nobody Loves Me
But My Mother (And She Could Be Jivin' Too)"). African-American alienation is
usually described as aimed at white society, but this need not be the case. Smith and
Seltzer observe that in everyday African-American conversation the poor position of
many African Americans is often explained by phrases like "Blacks don't stick
together" or "Niggers don't trust each other." Id. at 122. Note that this type of
alienation from African-American culture as well as from white would undermine the
idealized conception of a true African-American community.
252. John U. Ogbu, Variability in Minority School Performance: A Problem in
Search of an Explanation, 18 ANTHROPOLOGY & EDUC. Q. 312, 332 (1987).
253. WEIS, supra note 211, at 139. Weis quotes a student:
I figure that what they did was put the school right in our community-they said
"we'll give them this and this may satisfy them." ... [W]e were shortchanged
as far as the education itself was concerned .

. . . We're definitely cheated. I think what they're doing is "let's give the
blacks a place in their own neighborhood, then we can give them as little as
possible and maybe they'll be satisfied with it.... We'll give them as much as
we can and they'll keep their mouths shut."

Id. Similarly, at the New England School of Law in the late 1980s, African American
students charged that they were being cheated out of exam grades owed to them. They
believed that faculty were breaking the blind grading codes on exams and singling
out African American students for low grades. The students believed this although
they had no evidence other than the low grades. Their complaints expressed the high
level of alienation they were experiencing.
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African American law students whose identities are formed
in opposition to white culture are also at a disadvantage in law
school. African American law students who experience feelings
of alienation are likely to be estranged from and distrustful of
their predominantly white faculty and colleagues. 254 They may
not be able to participate in class without constantly looking
for the hidden ways in which faculty and other students are
manipulating them. For example, some African American
students may perceive that having once made a particular
point in reference to relations between Blacks and whites, they
are now repeatedly called upon to restate the same theme. 255
As a result, they may feel maneuvered into expressing a point
over and over again which they believed was true in the setting
in which they first articulated it, but which is not unambiguously the case in settings in which they are later called upon
to reproduce it.
In addition, being called upon repeatedly to restate the same
point about race may be alienating to an African American
student who may understand such a procedure as emphasizing
that she is the only one, or one of very few who, because of
race, holds a particular substantive position. The student may
feel reduced to a caricatured racial position for the benefit of
the surrounding whites. A student who is alienated and
perceives the world as described above may well decide to be
silent in the future-that is, to venture no more views that
would allow a complex identity to be whittled down to a white
teacher's view of race.

254. Although most law students, regardless of their race, feel a certain level of
alienation from law school, this is likely to be more acute and have clear racial
overtones for African American students, perhaps particularly for African American
women, who are already distrustful of the dominant white culture. See Armstrong,
supra note 226, at 44 n.2 (stating that women of color at predominantly white law
schools claim never to volunteer in class at higher rates than white women); see also
Montoya, supra note 88, at 9-17 (describing the Anglo "mask" she wore in law school
to guard against the disclosure of her Latina selO. For a study of women's alienation,
see Lani Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women's Experiences at One Ivy League
Law School, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 67-71 (1994) (describing the connection between
women's feelings of alienation in law school and their comparatively poorer performances), and Catherine Weiss & Louise Melling, The Legal Education of Twenty
Women, 40 STAN L. REV. 1299 (1988) (claiming alienation as a salient characteristic
of women's relation to law school).
255. Frances L. Ansley, Race and the Core Curriculum in Legal Education, 79 CAL.
L. REV. 1512, 1584 (1991) (describing an African American student's anger and
resentment at repeatedly being forced into service in class as "Mr. Equal Protection");
Angela D. Gilmore, It ls Better to Speak, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 74, 75 (1990-1991)
(recalling feelings of discomfort when issues surrounding race were discussed in class).
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African American students who feel alienated from the white
culture around them may believe themselves to be slighted
when they are not called upon to participate in classroom
discussions. 256 They may assume the professor considers them
to be unprepared for class or, worse yet, incapable of doing the
work. 257 Their feelings of alienation may make them suspect
the worst of their professors. 258
These African American students also may be less willing to
seek out white faculty informally for assistance or discussions
because they may fear the extreme inequality that often results
from Black-white informal relations. 259 The color-blind assumption that permeates legal education may mean that legal
educators do not even notice their lack of academic interchange
with some African American students. Generally it is thought
to be up to the students to initiate contact with the faculty;
usually it is assumed that there is no structural barrier to any
particular group of students taking advantage of the faculty's
presence. 260 African American law students, however, may
choose not to engage with faculty because such interactions
may have different meanings for those students than they
would for white students.
It also is possible that for some African American students,
alienation affects not only how they interact in class, but also
how they understand the doctrines that they are taught.
Donald Hill has claimed, for example, that some African
American law students resist the fact that oral contracts are
enforceable because of their distrust of the law as a white
insti tu ti on.
Black students resist the notion of oral contracts. They are
overly dependent on the sanctity of its written form ....
Black students equally resist the full acceptance of other

256. Ansley, supra note 255, at 1584 (describing an African American student
taking offense at not being called on more frequently).
257. Id.
258. Of course, it is also entirely possible that the professor was worried about the
students' ability to perform and thought that the best way not to "embarrass" them
was simply not to call on them. See Lawrence, supra note 60, at 328-44 (describing
white liberal unconscious racism).
259. Patricia Williams characterizes these relationships as "stranger-chattel"
relationships. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 148 (1991).
260. But see Guinier et al., supra note 254, at 71-75 (describing barriers to female
student interaction with faculty outside of class despite "equal" faculty treatment of
male and female students).
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contractual doctrines which are heavily weighted toward
such interpersonal dependencies, as good faith, reliance,
estoppel, custom and usage, course of dealing, etc ... .
[They also are inclined] to seek extreme safe guards, .. .
to cover every contingency in the negotiating and drafting
stages where reliance upon the verbal expressions of intent
are involved. 261
This is consistent with Patricia Williams's story about her
approach to renting an apartment. She and a white male
friend, Peter Gabel, went apartment hunting in New York City
at the same time. When Gabel found an apartment, he gave
the lessor a cash deposit without signing a lease or obtaining
keys or receipt in exchange. Williams, in contrast, upon finding
an apartment in a building owned by a friend, signed a lease
that was first negotiated in detail. She noted that both she and
Gabel were seeking to establish relationships of trust with
their landlords, but that their senses of how to establish trust
were very different:
Peter, for example, appeared to be extremely self-conscious
of his power potential (either real or imagistic) as a white
or male or lawyer authority figure ....
On the other hand, I was raised to be acutely conscious
of the likelihood that no matter what degree of professional I am, people will greet and dismiss my black femaleness
as unreliable, untrustworthy, hostile, angry, powerless,
irrational, and probably destitute. . . . As black, I have
been given by this society a strong sense of myself as
already too familiar, personal, subordinate to white people. I am still evolving from being treated as three-fifths of
a human, a subpart of the white estate. I grew up in a
neighborhood where landlords would not sign leases with
their poor black tenants, and demanded that rent be paid
in cash; ... such informality in most white-on-black situations signals distrust, not trust. Unlike Peter, I am still
engaged in a struggle to set up transactions at arm's
length, as legitimately commercial, and to portray myself

261. Hill, supra note 246, at 585-86; see Guinier et al., supra note 254, at 72-77
(noting social science findings that members of minority groups often perceive
informality as contrary to their interests).
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as a bargainer of separate worth, distinct power, sufficient
rights to manipulate commerce .
. . . For me, stranger-stranger relations are better than
stranger-chattel. 262
Law school does not take into account how an African
American student's sense of estrangement from white society
may affect her understanding of some legal subjects. Many
legal doctrines are premised on the idea that informally made
commitments should be enforceable. 263 Legal education assumes that this will be an equally acceptable concept to all
students. The possibility that some students may be culturally
positioned against believing in the enforceability of specific
types of commitments is simply not considered. Nor does legal
education take into account that these students may have
repeatedly experienced the unenforceability in practice of
informal commitments or that to African American students
such informal commitments may signal inequality instead of
equality. The cultural stance stems from and is reinforced by
the events of daily life. It should not be surprising that, under
such circumstances, it will be harder for these African American law students to believe what they are being taught than
for white students whose experiences reinforce the plausibility
and naturalness of the topics they are learning.
My point here is not to set out exhaustively all the relevant
ways in which African American law students may differ from
white ones. Rather, it is to show that for at least some students, such cultural differences do exist and undoubtedly will
be important in structuring the student's identity. These
students will not understand themselves to be the same as
white students, nor will they understand themselves as inferior. The process and content oflegal education, however, are
premised on the truth of one or the other of these two assumptions. For at least some African American law students,
legal education presents challenges to who they are and how
they know things that it never poses to many of the white
students.

262. WILLIAMS, supra note 259, at 147-48.
263. An example is the constellation of estoppel and reliance-based concepts that
permeate tort, contracts, and property law where one party is considered to be
entitled to rely on the other even in the absence of a written contract. See Ronald
Chester & Scott E. Alumbaugh, Functionalizing First-Year Legal Education: Toward
a New Pedagogical Jurisprudence, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 21, 65-70 (1991).
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CONCLUSION

Legal education describes African American law students as
the same as whites, while simultaneously portraying them as
different from and inferior to whites. What it does not recognize is the possibility of difference without subordination. As
shown in Part IV, some African Americans will understand
themselves as being different in ways that are important to
their identities but are not marks of inferiority. For these
students, legal education's promise to treat white and African
American students the same is an empty shell: legal education actually places obstacles in the way of some African
Americans, obstacles that are absent for whites.
How can it be, in a legal environment permeated with the
ideology of color blindness, that legal education is blind to its
own white structure? One answer is that the ideology of racial
neutrality contains within it the seeds of its own preferences.
The ideology of racial neutrality emphasizes that decisions
about the course of a person's life are not predetermined by
that person's race. Instead, individual choices set the direction
for one's life. The result is that African American students'
failures to excel are recast as the result of particular choices
that they have made, not as the result of structural obstacles
in front of them as African Americans. 264
African American students are blamed for their own failures
in ways that are very clear. The skills-based discourse of
academic support programs accuses them of not having developed sufficiently the necessary faculties of legal analysis and
legal writing. This accusation is consistent with a race-neutral
approach to these students because it presumes that they
have the same opportunities as white students to develop
these talents. This may be the case for some African American
law students, but for others who have distinct and different
African American identities, it will not be. Their attachment
to African American communities, their oral tradition of
signifying, and their alienation from the white society of the
faculty and their fellow students will affect their ability to
master particular skills.

264. This understanding is consistent with the legal system's emphasis on
individual choice within the ideology of color blindness. See supra text accompanying
notes 41-59 (discussing City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989)).
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Within the color-blind world of legal education, however,
their failings are not seen as due to the interaction between
their racial identities and a white-oriented system of legal
education. Instead, their failings are understood as being the
African American students' faults. Thus, they are seen as
choosing to engage in community activities instead of spending the time studying, choosing inept study groups composed
of other African American students, choosing to complain and
to be alienated instead of focusing on academic work, and
choosing to write in an insufficiently analytical fashion.
I do not want to argue that these are not choices. They are,
of course, but "choice" is a slippery word. Part of what is implied by the use of the word "choice" is that the meaning of
the choices is the same for these African American students
as it would be for white students. White students' racial
identities, however, are not likely to be challenged when they
make the systemically desired decisions. Their identity as
whites is much less likely to be implicated in their connections to specific communities inside and outside of the law
school, to the level of their involvement in the activities-in
class and extracurricular--of the law schqol, or to their particular style of communicating with others.
The decisions that African American law students must make
are understood within the culture of legal education as foregone in favor of study time, not community time, acquiescence
as opposed to opposition, and a willingness to write in the
required style. When some African American students make
the opposite choices because of their own racial identities, legal
educators do not understand what is at stake for them. This
is because the connection between the choices and racial
identities is not understood. Instead, race is seen as irrelevant
to how one organizes oneself in relation to law school. What
may be major issues of identity for some African American law
students are seen as frivolous, lazy, or inept decisions by the
color-blind culture of legal education. The result is that the
message of racial irrelevance can be maintained despite
disproportionately low performances by African American
students.
This stance-that the individual African American student
is at fault-makes it unnecessary to challenge the status quo
of legal education. If an African American's failure to perform
as well as white students is due to the African American
student's individual choices, then that failure cannot be laid
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at the door oflegal education. Law faculty need not reexamine
the content of their own individual courses nor, as a group,
need they restructure the curriculum.
For example, they need not reconsider the decision to evaluate student progress almost entirely through written work. 265
Although writing is undoubtedly an important part of what any
lawyer does, it is by no means the only way in which lawyers
communicate. One recent study of lawyering skills repeatedly
ranks oral communication as the most important skill, placing
it above written communication regardless of practice setting. 266 In a world in which oral communication is so important
to lawyers, it is anomalous that it is given such short shift in
law school. One might argue that this is because it is difficult
to evaluate a person's oral skills in a large class. But it is not
clear that evaluating short oral exams would take any longer
than reading the multi-hour written exams that are common
today. Furthermore, many schools have established writing
requirements for graduation that involve individualized faculty
supervision of long written projects. The resources used to
evaluate these long written projects could have been devoted
to evaluation of oral skills.
The assertion that African American law students are the
same as white students places the fault on African American
students when they do not succeed. It also makes it unnecessary to review the structure and content of legal education.
Finally, it reinforces the concept of a unitary legal profession.
Paul Carrington argues that for the legal profession to be one
single profession, "there needs to be an acknowledged common
. core of shared public values informing the professional work

265. The overwhelming majority of a student's credit hours are evaluated through
written projects. Occasionally these will be research papers or take-home exams, but
most commonly they will be traditional blue book exams. Kissam, supra note 90, at
437-38; Nickles, supra note 90, at 431-31; see Motley, supra note 90, at 753 (stating
that much of law students' work product consists of exams).
266. Bryant G. Garth & Joanne Martin, Law Schools and the Construction of
Competence, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 469 (1993). This study indicates that young Chicago
lawyers, lawyers from rural and medium sized cities in Missouri, and Chicago hiring
partners all ranked oral communication as more important than written communication, although in some cases the rankings were quite close. Id. at 473, 477. Similarly,
lawyers practicing for the government or a corporation gave priority to oral communication, while lawyers in private practice voted for written communication over oral
by only the slimmest of margins (written communication received a ranking of 1.19
on an "importance" scale and oral communication received a 1.20, with one being the
highest rating available and five being the lowest). Id. at 4 75.
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of its members." 267 Recognizing that African American law
students are not necessarily the same as white students, that
they may differ in important ways, would jeopardize the ideal
ofa unified profession. Lawyers, according to Carrington, must
be able to make "professional judgments that would coincide
with those of other [legal] professionals."268 Recognition of
African Americans' differences might require us to rework our
conception of law as a profession.
Thus, the construction of African American law students as
the same as white ones does not exist in a vacuum. It is
supported by, and supports, our current system of legal education and our larger ideas about the nature of the legal
profession. Until we are willing to question seriously the
subject matter and evaluative techniques of legal education
and its relationship to larger communities-ethnic or professional-we should not be surprised that a significant and
disproportionate number of African American law students
perform unsatisfactorily in law schools.

267.
268.

Carrington, supra note 91, at 505.
Id. at 506.

